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Abstract 
 
Bradley J. Trinkner II 
BOLSHEVIK VOICES: RADIO BROADCASTING IN THE SOVIET UNION,          
1917 – 1991 
2013/14 
James Heinzen, Ph.D. 
Master of Arts in History 
 
Radio broadcasting has a long and varied history in many industrialized nations 
yet research into radio in the Soviet Union has been given little attention from scholars. 
Radio offers the power to unite distant people and reinforce the party agenda yet also 
leaves the door open to unauthorized transmissions. The story of radio must be 
understood as two sides of the same coin, namely the motivation and purpose of 
broadcasting by the regime as well as the effects on those who listened. The dual purpose 
of broadcasting was represented both by the potential it offered party authorities as well 
as a subversive element for listeners when the reality for citizens rarely met the vision of 
the regime. The earliest years of Soviet broadcasting were hindered by material shortages 
and an inability to understand the special qualities of radio. The Stalin years and World 
War II transformed the purpose and function of broadcasting in Russia. The greatest 
challenge to central broadcasting came for foreign radio broadcasts that brought “enemy 
voices” into the homes of Soviet listeners as stations such as Voice of America and Radio 
Liberty provided news and entertainment that was more in line with the demands of 
native audiences. Despite the opportunity to use radio to reinforce the single narrative of 
Soviet history and to lay the grounds for the new Soviet man, authorities ultimately built 
an apparatus that did not offer widespread appeal and in many cases drove listeners to 
foreign broadcasting. As a result, Soviet radio did not build the state and the culture as it 
did in other nations. 
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In a 1947 broadcast, Radio Moscow boasted, “When Alexander Popov, the great 
Russian scientist, invented the radio he dreamed of enriching mankind with the most 
perfect method of communication and of broadening the outlook of peoples.”1 
Representing the vision of the model worker’s society, the Soviet Union never ceased to 
brag about its technical and modern achievements. In the early 20th century, few 
innovations represented modernity as effectively as radio. In 1945, just two days before 
World War II had officially ended, Joseph Stalin declared that the first Radio Day would 
be recognized on May 7th. This new holiday honored radio’s wartime contribution and 
coincided with the 50th anniversary of Alexander Popov’s public demonstration of 
broadcasting technology. In true Soviet fashion, Stalin considered Popov (a Russian) to 
have invented and pioneered the use of radio, thereby undermining its more traditionally 
recognized father, Guglielmo Marconi.2 While the truth behind Popov’s invention can be 
debated, it is fitting that Russia may have a right to claim ownership of one of the most 
powerful transmitters of knowledge civilization has ever known. Radio broadcasting 
revolutionized how humans communicate.  Numerous societies, recognizing radio’s 
potential, have used it as a way to connect people. As one of the 20th century’s textbook 
examples of totalitarianism, the Soviet regime depended on its ability to disseminate and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
1 “Soviet Radio is Truthful, Ours Not, Says Soviet Radio.” New York Times (1857-1922) 9 May 
1947.  http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed February 2, 2014).  
2 The debate has legs in our own time with a few individuals claiming the right to be called “inventor,” 
though many in Eastern Europe regard Popov’s radio receiver as taking precedence. 
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censor information in such a way as to mobilize its society. Broadcasting offered new 
possibilities for a society that was always finding ways to talk about itself. 
In many ways it seems as if broadcasting was tailor-made for the Soviet Union. 
The very existence of radio could be the crux of the totalitarian state - an opportunity to 
broadcast the party line into the homes, workplaces, and private lives of the ordinary 
Soviet citizen. For men like Stalin, broadcasting offered a mass media forum to unite the 
vast corners of the Soviet Union and take the Stalinist cult to new heights. Paradoxically, 
the very nature of radio waves made the medium an opportunity for subversion since 
complete censorship of outside broadcasts was nearly impossible. Almost anyone with a 
wireless receiver could gain access to the very information the party was trying to hide 
and to gain a glimpse of life on the other side of the Iron Curtain. The enormous potential 
of radio broadcasting in the Soviet Union offers perspective on some of the biggest topics 
in modern Soviet studies including the maintenance of private life, identity formation, 
mass media, and the techniques of propaganda and indoctrination.  
Despite the significant potential of this field of study, there is a puzzling lack of 
English-language scholarship. There are no monographs dedicated to Soviet 
broadcasting. The secondary literature has relegated radio to small passages or chapters 
in larger works on Soviet media. In the last few decades, most historical research has 
focused on print media, film, and television. Aside from print, no other medium reached 
more citizens, so the scholarly concentration on other media seems unfair given the 
availability and wide application of radio. When broadcasting is studied, it is almost 
always in the context of the Cold War and the ideological battleground with western 
radio. In the popular field of Cold War propaganda, western broadcasting for the 
	   3	  
expressed purpose of targeting Soviet listeners has seen significant scholarship, while 
other Soviet periods are relatively untouched by comparison. Part of the problem stems 
from the lack of available evidence of radio broadcasts. Only a few dozen sound 
recordings exist. Print and cinema from the Soviet era survive and are relatively available 
so it is considerably easier for the scholar to focus on these mediums rather than to 
speculate on radio broadcasting. Still, Soviet studies can certainly benefit from increased 
attention to both the opportunities and realities of Russian radio. 
Despite the lack of English-language scholarship, there have been a few studies 
undertaken to understand the phenomenon of broadcasting inside the USSR. Published in 
1959, Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer’s The Soviet Citizen explores daily life in a 
totalitarian society. Drawn predominantly from the interviews associated with the 
Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, the authors attempt to piece together major 
components of postwar society and exposure to mass media is given adequate attention. 
Radio broadcasting is not the focus of the book but the monograph provides ample 
quantitative and statistical information regarding exposure to radio and listening trends. 
The authors bring to life vital information about motivations for using radio as well as 
what classes and occupations relied on broadcasting. Given the books early publication 
and larger concentration on society as whole, a complete picture of radio is unobtainable 
especially when discerning the goals and motivations of the Soviet regime. 
A decade following Inkeles and Bauer’s sociological survey, Gayle Durham 
Hollander published a study in mass media and its audience in the post-Stalin years. 
Similar to her predecessors, Hollander’s Soviet Political Indoctrination uses radio 
broadcasting only as a way to understand the influence of political agitation and 
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propaganda. The author’s contribution comes by way of her investigations into both sides 
of broadcasting, the regime and the listener. Statistics provide a window into Soviet 
listening habits with information demonstrating distinctions in primary vs. secondary 
listening, peak listening hours, and criticisms of Soviet programming. The book also 
spends time understanding the extent to which foreign broadcasts were available and 
consumed by citizens. Again, radio is only a small part of the study’s focus and its 1972 
publication prevents it from investigating trends in the final two decades of the USSR. 
The 1970s also saw the publication of Mark Hopkins’s Mass Media in the Soviet Union. 
Similar to audience studies completed previous by Alex Inkeles, Hopkins focus is on both 
print and broadcast media and makes available information that had otherwise been 
available only in Russian. The monograph provides some of the first information on 
statistics for radio’s first decade as well as the development of the wired loudspeaker 
network but focuses most heavily on events since the end of World War II. Hopkins 
provides a fairly balanced study by investigating the motivations and struggles of 
radiofication on the part of the regime as well as criticisms of listeners. The study 
recognizes the discrepancy between radio’s potential and its implementation. The book is 
notably detail-oriented and losses sight of broadcasting’s impact on culture and offers 
events only up until the Brezhnev years.   
In the 1970s and 1980s, Radio Liberty was conducting informal polling of Soviet 
tourists to gain hard evidence on the audience for foreign radio. Similar to the Harvard 
Interview Project, subsequent studies have used that information to compile studies on 
media and foreign broadcasting’s impact on the Russian public. Ellen Propper 
Mickiewicz’s Media and the Russian Public, published in 1981, represents one the first 
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books available to Western audiences offering Soviet-conducted audience research that 
provided insight into television, radio, movies, theater, newspapers, and public lectures. 
Mickiewicz provides what is primarily a study into communications where she is intent 
on exploring exposure to mass media and public opinion. The book offers a wealth of 
information on programing preferences, listening habits, and statistics on demographics. 
Frequent comparisons with American media offer a framework in comparing 
communication systems. Mickiewicz’s major assumption is that Soviet media was 
incapable of satisfying the demands of the public in providing entertainment as well as 
fostering a youth culture. Using similar information from the 50,000 Radio Liberty 
surveys, R. Eugene’s Parta’s 2007, Discovering the Hidden Listener, provides an 
overview of the impact of Western radio with a focus on Radio Liberty. Writing his 
monograph from the listener’s perspective, the author investigates audience size, 
demographic trends, and other listening habits. While comparatively brief, the book 
provides interesting charts and graphs in an effort to quantify the experience of foreign 
broadcasting. Both of these studies are especially revealing though neither has much to 
say about domestic broadcasting nor radio’s earliest years of development prior to World 
War II.  
Without question, foreign radio broadcasting to the Soviet Union represents the 
greatest source of scholarship on Russian airwaves. Maury Lisann’s 1975 Broadcasting 
to the Soviet Union offers an analysis of the reaction of Soviet citizens and their 
government to foreign broadcasting. The author uses radio to understand feelings towards 
information media in general and its relation to government policies. A good portion of 
the monograph deals with Soviet efforts at jamming foreign broadcasts. Official 
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responses to foreign broadcasts provide an ideal framework for understanding the 
purpose and methods of the Soviet use of radio. In the last twenty years, former staffers 
of Western broadcasting stations have written reflections of their time fighting the Cold 
War over the airways. The 1999 Sparks of Liberty by Gene Sosin is an insider’s memoir 
detailing over thirty years working for Radio Liberty. Drawing both from memory and 
his own collection of papers, Sosin brings to life not only the programming but also the 
motivations and broadcasting decisions that made Radio Liberty one of the most effective 
and most regime-hated stations broadcasting into the country. The monograph is 
especially helpful in understanding the final years of the Soviet Union in an era of 
glasnost and perestroika. Despite its successes, the book is vague on audience impact and 
does not provide needed sources with respect to trends in Soviet listenership. 
The last ten years have offered some of the most comprehensive studies on the 
effects of radio broadcasting inside the Soviet Union and offers hope that increased 
understanding will continue to develop. Kristin Roth-Ey’s Moscow Primetime, published 
in 2011, investigates the Soviet media empire and how it lost the “cultural Cold War.” In 
similar fashion to earlier works, Roth-Ey does not provide an entire monograph dedicated 
to radio but focuses on the development of film, television, radio, and to a lesser extent, 
print media, since the 1950s. The author focuses on the explosive growth of radio during 
this period and the ways it allowed citizens to access the medium privately thus 
undercutting the collective activity of gathering around outdoor radio loudspeakers. The 
study spends a great deal of time looking into foreign radio and the regime’s largely 
unsuccessful attempts at jamming the “enemy voices.” Facts and figures taken from 
foreign and domestic sources are also presented and comment on everything from 
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production figures, to listener preferences, to demographic breakdowns. The author 
provides an overall look into the changing nature of Soviet broadcasting and the average 
radio listener all while tying the medium into a larger media empire.  
Perhaps the greatest gap in Soviet radio scholarship has been the origins of 
broadcasting in the earliest days of the regime and up through the Stalin years. While no 
monographs exist for this period, recent articles by Stephen Lovell have provided helpful 
coverage. The author’s 2011 “How Russia Learned to Listen” and 2013’s “Broadcasting 
Bolshevik” have explored the earliest motivations and struggles facing the regime as the 
foundations for broadcasting were being established. Lovell has linked radio with 
established oral agitation networks and its struggles in being recognized as more than just 
spoken newspaper. Through past studies on public speaking in Russia, Lovell has made 
interesting comparisons between radio and the Soviet emphasis on effective speaking as a 
means of inciting mass participation. The author admirably handles a lesser-documented 
era in radio’s history and places the emphasis on party authorities, broadcasters, and to a 
lesser extent, listeners themselves. The study also provides interesting statistics on the 
early wired radio network and audience accessibility. Both articles downplay radio’s 
influence on cultural formation beyond the links with Bolshevik-speak and neither traces 
developments any farther than the conclusion of World War II.  
It should be obvious that no study has taken a comprehensive look into the 
development and impact of radio in the world’s first communist nation. This thesis will 
attempt to fill in these gaps and provide a balanced picture of what radio meant for both 
the regime and its people. After all, broadcasting offered immense potential for Soviet 
authorities. Among the enduring problems of Russian history has been the ability to unite 
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the nation’s vast lands. Possessing close to 11.5% of the planet’s landmass or around 
8,144,000 square miles of country, Russia’s incredible size meant that early Bolshevik 
authorities needed to establish socialism in a land of numerous languages, ethnicities, 
cultures, and peoples spread across Eurasia. Radio was the first real opportunity to unite 
listeners from Petrograd to Vladivostok. Broadcasting could also reach those areas that 
were either cut off by geography or poor transportation. The early Bolshevik period saw 
the party develop as masters of print culture. The world’s first Marxist experiment 
required the education and mobilization of Russian peasantry and working classes. As 
sophisticated as newspaper production was, with a population around 160 million, and 
three-quarters of that number suffering from illiteracy in the early part of the century, 
many citizens could not be reached through ink and paper. Broadcasting offered the 
ability to overcome illiteracy as one voice could reach across the airwaves and into the 
hearts and minds of millions. Radio also fit perfectly into the Soviet culture of educating, 
mobilizing, and delivering the official worldview. From its early days the party was 
frequently trying to find ways to shape public opinion and radio was geared to achieving 
that in a way no other media could.  
 Despite radio’s potential to unite, broadcasting also offered the opportunity to 
undermine the regime. Soviet media was always known for its strict control of 
information and highly controlled censors to guarantee the precise flow of news. The 
problem for early broadcasters was the fact that radio was a “live” medium with potential 
for slipups or errors in inflection and interpretation. As the number of wireless radio sets 
grew so did the opportunities listeners had in interacting with the culture on their own 
terms. The way in which listeners used radio privately was not often what authorities had 
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in mind. The availability of shortwave sets in particular allowed for the reception of 
foreign broadcasts. “Enemy voices,” as Soviet authorities called them, broadcasted 
directly to Soviet audiences and presented a very real threat in the competition for 
listenership. Outside transmissions often provided more current news than could be heard 
inside the Soviet Union and thus lured listeners away from central broadcasting. Even 
when information was not current it generally was news that was being censored inside 
the USSR or was running contrary to official media sources. Soviet audiences were 
usually able to connect the dots and realize their media was not offering a complete 
picture, if they were hiding that information then what else were citizens not being told? 
While some western stations were indirect about their critique of the Soviet system, 
others were unabashed about their anti-Soviet stance and deliberately delivered attacks on 
the regime and propaganda intended to sway listening audiences. The availability of 
shortwave radio in the Soviet Union opened a window to a world that those in power saw 
as better left closed. 
In looking at the entirety of Russia’s communist years it is obvious that radio 
broadcasting had always held a dual purpose in the history of the Soviet Union; offering 
immense potential for authorities and the fulfillment of their goals yet providing a 
subversive element as the reality for citizens rarely met the vision of the regime. 
Numerous questions will be considered as this thesis investigates the history and 
influence of radio broadcasting inside the Soviet Union. Who exactly had access to radio? 
For what purposes did they listen? How much of its content was believed and what kind 
of impact did it have? What was the impact of foreign broadcasting? To what extent 
would listeners have admitted they were tuning into foreign stations? In what way did 
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these foreign programs run contrary to official transmissions from the party apparatus and 
thus undermine Soviet propaganda efforts? Were they acts of defiance or simply 
motivated by curiosity?  
This thesis will attempt to understand the impact of radio broadcasting on the 
country throughout the course of the Soviet regime. Special attention will be focused on 
the early Bolshevik period and the birth of broadcasting, the growth and development of 
the medium during the Stalin years, the transformation and importance of radio during 
the war, post-Stalin liberalization and its effect on broadcasting, the challenge of foreign 
radio, and radio in the final years of the regime. The history of broadcasting inside the 
USSR must be understood from the perspective of both the Soviet authorities and the 
everyday citizen. In separating these two perspectives we are treated with a unique 
understanding of the potential radio offered, as well as its official goals. We can then 
place those in juxtaposition to what the reality on the ground was and how impactful 
these goals were. Radio was an essential feature to 20th century life and came to have 
enormous impact on the building of nations such as the United States, Great Britain, and 
Germany. Radio was a perfect fit for the Soviet experiment. The building of the socialist 
state needed the opportunities broadcasting could provide, opportunities that could 
effectively make or break this new society.  
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Chapter 2 
Bolshevik Broadcasting: Radio’s Early Years in the Soviet Union 
 
 
 “What the press was to the nineteenth century, radio will be to the twentieth.”1 
The quote from Joseph Goebbels was originally intended as a statement of the immense 
potential broadcasting offered Germany and the building of the Nazi state. Within the 
Soviet Union it was very obvious that even the earliest Bolsheviks recognized its 
potential. Lenin himself hailed the possibilities of radio in the 1920s, referring to it as 
“newspaper without paper and ‘without distances.’”2 For the man who brought a 
communist revolution into the world, broadcasting seemed the perfect fit for educating 
the masses and uniting the workers from all corners of Russia. Broadcasting would fill 
the communications gap by delivering information over great distances. Popular 
ignorance of Marxist-Leninist terminology was an early concern for the Bolsheviks and 
the effective use of language was integral to building support for party goals. Lenin 
believed that through educational enrichment the lowest classes would be able to lift 
themselves from their backwardness and take full stock in building the Soviet state.3 A 
1925 party directive made specific mention of the “significant role which radio should 
play as a powerful means of education and propaganda.”4 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
1 Kristin Roth-Ey, Moscow Primetime: How the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire that Lost the Cultural 
Cold War (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2001), page 6. 
2 Vladimir Lenin, “Letter to M.A. Bonch-Bruyevich,” Marxists Internet Archive, accessed June 1, 2014, 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/feb/05mabb.htm. 
3 James Von Geldern, Mass Culture in Soviet Russia: Tales, Poems, Songs, Movies, Plays, and Folklore, 
1917 – 1953 (Indiana University Press, 1995), xvi. 
4 Mark W. Hopkins, Mass Media in the Soviet Union (New York: Pegasus, 1970), 244. 
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Motivations and Potential of Soviet Broadcasting 
Culture was a weapon of class struggle and radio was a way to develop that 
culture and remake the consciousness of the citizen. The Bolsheviks had learned from 
both the revolution and the civil war the value of mass media and its partisan 
implications. Seeking to deny the opposition access to public opinion, the party 
established a state monopoly over agents of cultural dissemination including movie 
houses, printing presses, and theaters – broadcasting stations fit right into this fold.5 
Published later than the focus of this chapter, the following excerpt from an article 
appearing in Pravda dated May 7, 1953, encapsulates the vision for radio: 
Radio broadcasts in our country must bring to the masses the all-victorious ideas 
of Marxism-Leninism, the ideas of Soviet patriotism and proletarian 
internationalism. They must have an active role in the communist education of the 
Soviet people, in the propaganda of the advanced experience of industry and 
agriculture, in politically informing the population and in popularizing the 
achievements of Soviet culture, science, and technology.6 
 
Radio was to be the medium to facilitate the education and inspiring of the masses 
through the doctrine of Marxism. In many ways, radio was an extension of the oral 
agitation network developed shortly following the Bolshevik coup. Professional 
propagandists were sent out to inspire and mobilize the Russian people into creating the 
new society; these agitators were most responsible for bringing the party message across 
the country.  
While the Bolsheviks were masters of the printed word, newspapers could only 
take the message so far. The voice of agitators could supplement the papers by appealing 
to those who could not read and offering further explanations to those who could. Lenin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
5 Von Geldern, Mass Culture, xi. 
6 Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 18, vol. 5, June 1953, p. 18-19. 
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believed that good speakers were made and not born; these were individuals who could 
read the relevant party congress resolutions, speak directly, and avoided tones of haughty 
arrogance.7 Stephen Kotkin’s Magnetic Mountain coined the idea of “speaking 
Bolshevik,” the process of turning the new communist verbiage into political discourse.  
Historian Stephen Lovell argues that radio, in a similar tradition, continued the trend of 
“broadcasting Bolshevik.”8 The airwaves were a fitting place to familiarize the Soviet 
people with the language and ideas of the party and imbue society with the new identity 
of Homo sovieticus. The revolutionary period had placed a premium on the ability to 
effectively communicate through speech. This was one of the principle ways by which to 
establish communist discourse and work to elicit popular participation at the same time. It 
was not too much of a stretch to see radio broadcasting as a natural successor to this oral 
agitation network.  
 
Early Problems of Radiofication 
Russian naval transmissions represent the first use of broadcasting in the nation 
but radio would soon make the transition over to the civilian sector.9 Most of the earliest 
radios in the Soviet Union were made to deliver broadcasts along a wired network. 
Broadcasts would be sent through the airwaves, picked up by a relay station and then sent 
along a diffusion network made up of telegraph lines to public amplifiers (radiotochki). 
The Soviet Union was largely connected by this wired loudspeaker network until the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
7 Stephen Lovell, “Broadcasting Bolshevik: The Radio Voice of Soviet Culture, 1920s – 1950s” Journal of 
Contemporary History 48, no. 78 (2013): 82. 
8 Ibid., 79. 
9 Richard Stites, Russian Popular Culture: Entertainment and Society since 1900 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1992), 81. 
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1950s and it would not be until 1963 that wireless set (priemniki) numbers would surpass 
those of wired speakers. For the Soviet regime, wired sets offered certain advantages over 
their freestanding cousins. Since these sets received signals that were relayed across 
telegraph lines and into a loudspeaker, listeners were unable to control the station or alter 
the reception of the broadcast signal. This was especially beneficial for Soviet authorities, 
as citizens had no choice but to hear the official worldview of the party. In many ways 
wired sets operated more along the lines of a public address system than a radio in the 
modern sense of the word, delivering news or updates without the listener’s ability to 
change channels or switch off. 
The early wired network certainly shaped the culture of listening and impacted 
broadcasting trends for years to come. One of the most important trends was the access to 
broadcasts and who was listening. The relay network was hindered by the technological 
availability of the day. Loudspeakers generally were limited to areas where both electric 
and communication lines were available; in most cases this favored urban over rural 
areas. The process of electrification was a major goal of the early Bolsheviks though 
bringing electricity to the whole of Russia was an enormous task that would take years to 
complete and thus this radio relay network was subsequently stymied. This was not the 
only hindrance as wired sets also relied on available equipment and expertise that were 
chronically in short supply. Electrification was never much of a concern for the 
agricultural establishment and electrical engineers faced more interesting challenges than 
connecting distant villages.10 As would be the case in so much of Soviet history this 
meant that whole areas of the nation’s countryside went unconnected and remained 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
10 Jonathan Coopersmith, The Electrification of Russia, 1880 – 1926 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1992), 167. 
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unaware of broadcasting technologies. Ironically, the lack of electricity often coincided 
with areas of highest illiteracy. As these amplifiers functioned more in the realm of 
public address systems, collective listening became the cultural norm. The average 
listener did not have an amplifier in their home, and in most cases they appeared in public 
places such as town centers, inside factories, or on farms where electricity was available. 
For much of the early days of broadcasting, listening was a communal activity with 
Soviet citizens huddled around an amplifier. In other industrialized nations, radio was 
considerably more developed by the 1920s and had become a standard item of furniture 
for many households. That kind of independent availability was turning Western radio 
into a more intimate experience in contrast to the Soviet Union where it would remain a 
collective activity until after the war. Such an activity was also very much along the lines 
of the kind of camaraderie and popular shared participation that the regime was 
attempting to foster.11  
 
Early Successes 
The early years of Soviet broadcasting were not without their successes, many of 
which were in some ways impressive given the state of the country following the civil 
war and the challenges of building the communist state. The party understood the 
potential and even developed commissions to explore the progress of radio technology in 
foreign countries. By the mid to late 1920s, foreign companies were being consulted on 
developing Russia’s transmission technologies. Firms such as Westinghouse, RCA, and 
the General Wireless Telegraph Company of Paris were exchanging patents and offering 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
11 Lovell, Listen, 601. 
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technical assistance.12 By 1928, thirty-six foreign firms were engaged in giving necessary 
radio support to the Soviet Union.13 Much of the earliest developments actually came 
from ham radio operators. This type of grassroots enthusiasm was used by the Bolsheviks 
to advance radiofication, and in 1923 the Society of Radio Lovers was created. The build-
your-own style of radio development was well within the Soviet concept of ingenuity 
over obstacles. In the words of Stephen Lovell, “radio hams, in the Soviet Union as 
elsewhere, were almost by definition self-motivated loners for whom the pursuit of new 
frequencies and the quest to transmit over ever greater distances stood far above the 
spread of popular enlightenment.”14 Among the most exciting achievements for these 
radio amateurs was to receive broadcasts from the United States, an early sign of the 
interest in life outside the Soviet Union. Before authorities lost control over access to 
information, authorities criminalized the use of unregistered radio equipment by 1924.15  
The first broadcasting station opened in 1922 but the first public broadcast was 
not made until 1924. Over the next ten years, the number of stations continued to rise 
with 23 stations in 1929, 60 stations in 1932, and 90 stations by 1933.16 Much of these 
later numbers can easily be associated with the expansion of industry and infrastructure 
under Stalin’s First Five-Year Plan. The wired relay network was not the only form of 
broadcasting in the Soviet Union as wireless transistor radios were introduced in much 
more modest numbers. Owning a transistor radio was a status symbol and would remain 
so until the 1960s. Members of the communist party were often among the privileged few 
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that were able to afford or have access to wireless sets. Radio, for many citizens, was the 
perfect symbol of modernity and the progress of the Soviet state. 
Radio offered the opportunity to bring Soviet philosophy and ideology to the 
masses. The first live direct broadcast came on November 7, 1925 during the 8th 
anniversary of the Revolution. While most of the speeches from that day had already 
been broadcast and would appear in print, this broadcast offered insight into how the 
capital was “abuzz and enjoying itself.”17 Listeners could hear the sounds of bells and 
military maneuvers as the announcer verbally painted a picture of the hanging tapestries, 
the marble busts of Lenin and Marx, as well as the joyous expressions on the face of the 
crowd as the parade moves along. 
Comrades, we’re coming up on Red Square. What a tremendous stream of people. 
A mighty, great power, the power of October, is moving this stream. There are no 
sad or cloudy faces. The holiday belongs to all workers; they feel close to it and 
have a heartfelt understanding of it. A holiday for workers and their children... 
We are next to Lenin’s tomb. A megaphone booms: “Long live the worldwide 
victory of workers!” The little red flag quivers, and the proletarian tot yells in a 
bell-like little voice: “Hurrah!”18 
 
This form of live commentary would be important in future May Day and Revolution 
Day celebrations and key parts of the radio calendar. Scenes such as this brought listeners 
into far off events in ways never before imagined. Broadcasts showed the party for the 
first time the ability of radio to allow for popular participation. In the past, Pravda could 
write up descriptions or publish pictures of events like this but radio could make every 
listener feel as if they too had taken part, these shared experiences had the opportunity to 
foster a sense of closeness between people in ways never before imagined.  
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 Despite the preponderance of news and information programs, the majority of 
airtime was devoted to music. Classical music and opera were in the same spirit of the 
cultural and educational enrichment Lenin had hoped would lift the masses out 
ignorance. The first radio concert premiered in 1922 and would only continue to grow 
along with the expansion of public broadcasting. Alongside music, radio programs were 
also becoming more class specific. By 1926, separate programs for workers and peasant 
audiences were being introduced.19 The party recognized the ability of radio to target and 
appeal to the unique interests and conditions of these two halves of the Soviet economy. 
It was already showing signs of being a vehicle by which to unite Russian labor behind 
the goals of the state. 
Despite enormous success, radio broadcasting in the early Soviet period was not 
without its problems. As mentioned earlier, the task of making radio broadcasting 
available to the majority of citizens was not an easy task. The process of radiofication 
required a rather large investment of money, technology, and resources – all which would 
have been in chronic short supply in the first decade of Soviet rule. The civil war did not 
end until 1922 and when it did, the extent of devastation was overwhelming and 
economic recovery was certainly a long way off. As mentioned earlier, one of the biggest 
issues impeding radiofication were early efforts at electrification and the substantial 
barriers it offered to establishing a vast wired network. Soviet energy production 
throughout the 1920s was only one-twentieth of the United States and by 1928 only 
92,000 receivers existed in the whole of the Soviet Union. Almost all of these receivers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
19 Lovell, “Broadcasting Bolshevik,” 83. 
	   19	  
could be found in cities where one-sixth of the country’s population lived.20 Russia’s 
problems with reaching its rural audience would continue until long after the Stalin years. 
Even in these areas where broadcasting was delivered, the peasants’ unfamiliarity with 
radio proved a major obstacle. People had to be convinced that an amplifier broadcasting 
a disembodied voice was worth their time. 
     Oddly enough, one of the greatest hurdles facing early radio was deciding what 
purpose the medium would serve. Even before the advent of radio, Soviet authorities had 
a difficult time deciding whether the spoken word would best serve oratorical or 
information purposes. Were agitators speaking in order to inspire or to inform their 
listeners so how much natural speaking talent was needed? Radio, as a form of mass 
culture, had another difficult question implicit in its broadcasts. Was the medium 
operating in such a way as to edify, inform, or to entertain? The dilemma of finding the 
appropriate balance would be a considerable way off and had no real answer in the 
earliest days of Russian broadcasting.  
Just as Lenin had originally seen the potential of radio to bring newspaper-like 
information to the people, so did many others who could originally only understand 
broadcasting in the context of a spoken newspaper. The technology was so new and its 
purpose so similar to printed news it is hard to imagine that many people would have 
seen radio as an art form or a medium in its own right. Some were seeing broadcasting as 
an extant of agitation and more along the lines of a “glorified loudspeaker.”21 As the first 
broadcast announced on November 23, 1924 noted, “radio newspaper is the most live 
newspaper in the world. It is written in lively conversational language. It consists of 
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lively short articles. And lively short announcements. Anyone who picks up the receiver 
of their radio set will listen through the end. And they’ll find out about all the most 
important political and other events.”22 Along these same lines, “radio wall newspapers” 
had a similar methodology. Inside a workplace, one person would be charged with 
listening to a full TASS report and then write down the main points to display for the 
other comrades.23 Many listeners complained of the sheer redundancy as radio was often 
reporting the same information as was appearing in the papers and being discussed in 
worker meetings. Without an understanding of radio’s special qualities it became difficult 
to be able to overcome written language. Listeners were having a hard time listening to 
large texts on a single theme and getting bogged down with statistical information. In 
combination with electrification issues, equating radio with the printed word was the 
greatest obstacle toward radio growth.24  
The earliest problems not only involved misunderstandings on the part of the 
regime and the listener but also on the radio broadcaster as well. In its infancy, 
broadcasting authorities had difficulty deciding how news and information should be 
presented and whether radio announcing was a skill unto itself. Reflecting the Bolshevik 
emphasis on effective communication and impactful speaking, some of the earliest 
announcers were actually Russian actors brought in to read the news, many of who came 
from the Moscow Arts Theatre.25 Even these individuals seasoned with reading from a 
script had difficulty finding their voice. It took time trying to find the balance between 
projection and conversational language and some struggled with feeling any type of 
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audience connection when broadcasting in an empty room. Were announcers considered 
readers, actors, or something else entirely? Broadcasters were also faced with a bevy of 
glitches given the inadequacy of technical support in the early years. Without the ability 
to pre-record, radio was very much a live medium in its early years where slipups, 
incorrect pronunciations, errors in intonation and other aired mistakes were not 
uncommon.  
Radio seems to have been a source of great anxiety for a party that strove for 
unblemished authority. Even when broadcasting music, radio workers simply placed a 
gramophone next to the microphone, while scraping chairs and footsteps could be heard 
during the broadcast. The consequences of such mistakes sometimes lead to arrests. Due 
in large part to strict government censors, many announcers complained that they were 
given scripts too late to adequately prepare for broadcasts. It was estimated by one radio 
worker that 90% of all mistakes stemmed from poor editing and the lack of preparation 
time needed to spot such errors.26 All in all, radio workers complained that they were 
under too much pressure and were both underpaid and overworked. In Gorkii, far from a 
major metropolitan area like Moscow, the production schedule included two daily news 
broadcasts of thirty minutes each, two agitprop programs of thirty-five minutes each, one 
survey of local newspapers for fifteen minutes, twenty minute youth programs that were 
broadcast three times a week, as well as weekly and monthly musical and literary 
programs. The Gorkii station had just fifty-eight employees, most with less than a year of 
radio experience.  
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If broadcasting resources around urban areas were poor, then in the countryside it 
could only be described as embarrassing for Soviet authorities. One of the biggest 
problems of radio outside the Russian heartland was finding competent staff in these 
remote regions. Editing texts in local languages proved to be one of the greatest obstacles 
outside of the inadequacy of local resources. Many of these stations were simple wooden 
shacks, where often the greatest qualification for broadcasting was just being literate. 
Radio schedules in the 1920s made few concessions to rural populations and the 
programming from Moscow Central spoke for these peripheral settlements. Not only was 
this a result of underdeveloped resources but likely a way to end the cultural divide 
between the city and countryside. The socialist society needed a uniform culture as 
variations implied ideological unorthodoxy in the eyes of party. In the words of James 
von Geldern, “the disappearance of autonomous environments meant that local cultural 
production was replaced by centralized institutions. Cities, towns, and villages in the 
center and the provinces heard and saw approximately the same thing, aided by new 
expanse-shrinking technologies – foremost the radio.”27   
 
Conclusion 
From the earliest days of public broadcasting to the transition to Stalinist rule, the 
development of radio inside the Soviet Union was slow and uneven at best. The audience 
was small due in large part to the obstacles in the way of radiofication and the 
geographical challenges of Russia. Wired speakers were largely confined to public 
squares and “red corners” inside factories, although they were designed to target large 
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groups of listeners, they inevitably made listening for any great length of time difficult. 
With wireless transistor radios still operating as more of a luxury item and a few decades 
away from mass availability, radio audiences remained low. The collective nature of 
listening meant that news and information would only be heard during the very limited 
free time available to workers. Given the relative novelty and lack of broadcasting 
experience, authorities recognized the potential but did not commit the technological 
resources or provide the education necessary to make the medium fully realized.  
Historian Mark Hopkins believes that radio was too young at this stage to draw 
the full support of Soviet political leadership.28 As radio struggled to find its place in its 
first few years, it fell back on the familiar and functioned more as the “newspaper without 
the paper” that Lenin had originally envisioned. The redundancy of hearing and reading 
the same news would be a significant impediment for growing the interest in domestic 
broadcasting for the next few decades. While the reality of what radio could be at this 
early period was not fully realized, the vision for radio’s potential is certainly discernable 
at this time. By the 1930s the country was fully in the grips of Stalin’s economic and 
social revolution and, like much of the nation, radio’s purpose would be redefined. With 
war also looming on the horizon, the next three decades would prove decisive for the 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
28 Hopkins, Mass Media, 246. 
	   24	  
Chapter 3 
 
Radio’s “Revolution from Above:” Soviet Broadcasting in the Stalin Years 
 
  
The decades of the 1930s and 1940s represent a period of fundamental change in 
the history of the Soviet Union. The nation redefined its reputation as a cultural and 
economic backwater and repositioned itself as a world power capable of repelling the 
armies of Adolf Hitler and shaping the postwar world. The reforms associated with 
Stalin’s “revolution from above” brought Russia a second revolution that hastened some 
of the greatest economic and social change seen in the 20th century. Broadcasting found 
itself once again in the middle of the party’s new vision. Though this vision would take a 
backseat as the country was thrown into the grips of the Great Patriotic War and radio 
was called on to unite the nation. Party propaganda and traditional censorship rules were 
relaxed so as to bring both comfort and hope all while invoking the patriotism necessary 
to counter the fascist invasion of the motherland. While the earliest years of Soviet 
broadcasting were uneven and slowed by a lack of familiarity, the expansion and 
acceleration of broadcasting changes represent a new chapter in radio’s long history, 
though a chapter filled with successes and failures. 
 
The Expansion of Broadcasting 
  Despite the significant changes radio would undergo in the Stalin years, the 
period began with significant obstacles. With the Soviet regime firmly established in the 
1920s and the greater availability of newspapers (Pravda, Izvestia, and numerous local 
papers), print became the dominant means of information dissemination by the 
communist regime. Radio was still in its infancy and the print culture was more familiar 
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and well established. Stephen Lovell argues that public speaking had lost its charismatic 
origins by the Stalinist period as the printed word came to represent orthodox scripture; 
for all intents and purposes, what appeared in Soviet newspapers was to be accepted as 
truth.29 Official governmental and party positions were spelled out first in print and 
reinforced through speech as needed. Citizens who had access to radio were wise to keep 
up with print culture even if that meant reading between the lines. The vast majority of 
respondents from the Harvard Interview Project who admitted listening to radio also said 
they kept up with at least one other national or local paper. Despite this preference for the 
printed word, Soviet authorities still invested significant resources into the expansion of 
radio broadcasting. As part of the industrial reforms that came along with the First Five-
Year Plan, by 1932, the power of radio transmissions had been augmented eight times 
since radio’s introduction and the number of broadcasting stations had doubled to 
ninety.30 By 1940, the number of radio receivers had increased nearly seven times to 7 
million including both wired and wireless sets. Of that figure, only 1.6 million were in the 
countryside, which represents a notable increase over the previous period but one that 
continued to show the challenges of reaching Russia’s rural population. The audience for 
radio at this time was likely over 10 million due in large part to the collective nature of 
radio listening.31 
Radio became a mass medium for the first time in the 1930s. Radio’s equation 
with progress and modernity continued through this period as well. The ability to own a 
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wireless set was often a status symbol and many citizens expressed disappointment in not 
being able to own a radio. In describing a friend of his, the diary of Andrei Stepanovich 
Arzhilovsky dated November 13, 1936 saw “sign(s) of prosperity everywhere, a coat 
lined with expensive fur, two new pairs of felt boots… Life for them indeed has gotten 
better and happier; the radio blares right into your ear, keeping you posted about the latest 
events in the world.”32 Wireless radios were still rare for much of the 1930s as sets 
themselves were out of the price range of the average Russian worker. Ownership of sets 
seems to have been limited to military officials, the NKVD, technicians and other 
specialists, party officials, managers of big plants, and the chairmen of the local raikon / 
obkom. Citizens lucky enough to own their own wireless set had to register their radio 
with the NKVD at the local post office.33 Wireless and wired sets could increasingly be 
found throughout the Soviet Union especially in public areas and various clubrooms of 
universities, collectives, and gulags to name a few. Radios were traditionally a principal 
source of entertainment in smaller towns that lacked other amenities like movies and 
stadiums. What does seem clear is that it was pretty hard to escape radio or at least the 
loudspeaker by 1949. 
 
Soviet Broadcasting in International Context 
 The growth of broadcasting in Russia throughout the 1930s was very much in line 
with its development in other industrial states; still, a comparative look reveals some of 
the unique challenges of the Soviet Union. Radio in Nazi Germany makes one of the best 
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comparisons as both states were increasingly centered on totalitarian rule with similar 
propaganda and mobilization needs. German officials had become convinced of the 
power of propaganda after falling behind on that front in World War I. Unlike the Soviet 
Union, German broadcasting was not introduced by the state, rather it was a loosely knit 
network of independent regional companies in which Berlin had only marginal political 
influence.34 In 1932, German radio was nationalized under Franz von Papen in an attempt 
to provide pro-government broadcasts at a time when the Weimar Republic’s legitimacy 
and support was at a definite low point. Hitler also recognized the potential of radio to 
support the regime and subsequently developed one of the most sophisticated 
broadcasting networks. In March 1933, Hitler specifically mentioned radio as necessary 
for reaching the population for war measures, citing its ability to “mold the character and 
will of the German nation and train a new political type.”35 In this way German and 
Russian motivations were very much the same. 
 Despite the similarities in the ideologies of broadcasting, the reality of the 
situation for each country was very different. By the 1930s, the Russian broadcasting 
system was still operating on the very beginning of radio technology whereas the Nazis 
had inherited a sophisticated working system. The Volkempfänger (people’s set) was an 
inexpensive radio set made for mass-market audiences as both the price and technological 
sophistication persuaded average Germans to purchase these sets; licensing fees were 
also kept low for a similar reason. Between August 1933 and July 1934, 37 percent of all 
radios sold in Germany were people’s sets and the Nazi party found a direct voice into 
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the private lives of its citizens.36 As a result of these developments, wireless sets became 
a common household item in Germany by 1937 in a way that Soviet sets would not be 
until the early 1960s. Wireless radios in Russia were fairly expensive and predominately 
seen as a luxury item; on average, most sets cost anywhere between 700 – 1,500 rubles. 
One citizen who owned a “Minsk” set (offering 4 bands: two shortwave, one medium 
wave, and one long wave) cost him around 1,000 rubles adding up to about two months 
salary not accounting for the cost of food.37 More expensive sets such as the “Neva” 
model could run upwards of 2,600 rubles, far out of the price range for almost all 
ordinary workers. Purchasing a wireless radio usually meant sacrificing other things such 
as buying new shoes. One citizen reported buying a radio over a suit (the respondent felt 
he was too old and no longer handsome enough to justify the purchase).38  
The Soviet preference for collective listening meant that wired sets were still the 
preferred medium and the one most available to the masses. In place of freestanding sets, 
wired reproducers could be installed in a home for considerably less money. 
Loudspeakers were usually installed for 25 rubles per line and between 3 – 5 rubles a 
month for its use. This was common for foreign citizens living in the Soviet Union as 
they were not allowed to own a radio but could have a reproducer installed instead.39 The 
drawback to this would undoubtedly be the listener’s inability to choose what they were 
hearing. Horst Bergmeier and Rainer Lotz argue that German Propaganda Minister 
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Goebbels may have deserved the Soviet-style of wired uniformity.40 Alas, such a network 
was never established but it certainly can be argued that Germany was more effective at 
reaching a greater number of people in the end. The year Hitler would be named 
Chancellor (1933), there were an estimated 4.3 million receivers and with Nazi policies 
that number doubled the next year. By 1941, there were around 15 million sets reaching 
some 50 million listeners.41  
By 1936, German broadcasting was significantly ahead of all other countries in 
terms or technology, equipment, staff numbers, and expertise, and as a result the Soviet 
Union certainly seemed backwards by comparison.42 If Russian broadcasting was placed 
in the context of another communist and formerly agricultural state like China, the 
observations are certainly more kind. Chinese broadcasting did not begin in earnest until 
1945, substantially later than most other countries. The task of trying to communicate 
with the whole of the nation was very similar to the obstacles facing the early Bolsheviks 
in the 1920s. China’s large population, vast distances, relative economic backwardness, 
low consumer buying power, and rampant illiteracy all mirror the Soviet experience and 
reflect similar motivations behind the expansion of broadcasting. Similar to German 
development, Chinese radio consisted of eighty-three stations in 1950 that all were 
slowly absorbed by the state.43 Both China and Russia faced shortages of equipment, 
electronic manufacturing, and personnel. For similar reasons, the Chinese communist 
government placed resources into the building of the wired network. The collective 
listening element was an attractive prospect for a government that valued peasant over 
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industrial labor and envisioned a future of state-run collectivized farms with an emphasis 
on the communal life of the farmers. The communist party required peasants to visit 
community auditoriums to listen to broadcasts for these very reasons.44 The Soviet 
recognition of the power of radio to fulfill propaganda needs was also a hallmark of 
Chinese broadcasting. Chou Yang, Chinese deputy minister of the Propaganda 
Department, argued, “broadcasting should promote the propaganda of the Great Leap 
Forward. Radio broadcasting must carry out propaganda for agriculture and industry... 
Broadcasting is allowed to criticize but its primary function is to encourage.”45 This 
statement is precisely the same rhetoric we see used in providing agitation and 
mobilization of Soviet labor for supporting Stalin’s economic and social reforms. 
China’s difficulty in reaching its rural population was an all too familiar problem 
for the Soviets as well. As in the previous period, electrification remained one of the 
greatest barriers to radiofication in the countryside. Despite the obstacles, the number of 
sets available to the peasants (mostly in the form of wired reproducers) rose from 
650,000 in 1936 to over 1.3 million in 1947.46 While the doubling of available radios 
represents a substantial increase, it remains a paltry figure given the size of Russia’s rural 
population. The average kolkhoznik could not afford to purchase a radio even if they 
were to work their entire life. Unlike Mao’s China, Stalin placed significant resources 
into building Russia’s industrial working class at the expense of the peasantry and this 
seems especially obvious when we consider the inability of radio to reach the Soviet 
countryside. When it came to reaching the villages and shaping the opinions of the 
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kolkhoz, peasants were more influenced by oral agitation than radio broadcasting. As 
long as the resources dedicated to radiofication were confined to major urban areas, the 
villages would continue to remain outside the pale of broadcasting. 
 
Musical Content 
 Throughout the 1930s, the basic structure of radio broadcasting remained much 
the same as it had in the previous decade. News, which was highly propagandized, and 
music comprised the general format of Soviet broadcasting with small additions added on 
occasion. The recognition of radio as a cultural apparatus was becoming realized 
throughout this period. In 1935, Rose Ziglin, Director of the International Bureau of the 
Committee for Radiofication and Broadcasting in Moscow, published an article detailing 
the success of radio inside of the Soviet Union as well as the vision for radio’s potential. 
In her own words, “radio broadcasting brings the toilers close to the social and political 
life of the country, and interests them in music, literature, art and science.”47 In the same 
tradition of Lenin’s cultural enrichment of the masses, music remained the bulk of airtime 
and continued to be one of the major motivations for listening to radio. In 1928, music 
accounted for 96 percent of all broadcasting with news and speeches rounding out the rest 
of the time.48 Operas and classical music continued to be the majority of music played 
over radio and with the invention of recording capabilities, live performances and plays 
could be recorded and then broadcast at a later date; some operas would last up to two 
and a half hours.  
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Despite the predominance of classical music, most listeners preferred popular or 
folk music. Jazz, which was especially popular in many western nations, was officially 
censored inside the Soviet Union in lieu of its label as “bourgeois eroticism.”49 
Proletarian composers attempted to create substitutes by creating songs for workers and 
collectivized farmers but they rarely caught on. Following the success of the First Five 
Plan, the subsequent celebrations saw a restoration of celebrity, officer ranks, and other 
signs of privilege – one of these being jazz. The “Red Jazz Age” lasted from 1932 to 
1936 and produced huge radio hits such as “Katyusha” and “Over Hill and Dale” both by 
the peasant-born Lydia Ruslanova. Interests in American-style dance and other jazz styles 
came to replace the “mass song” that was promoted just a few years earlier. This 
remained the case until the period of the purges where such music could easily be linked 
with subversion and western leaning. From this period up until the war, mass song and 
more traditional dance music would reign supreme. Moscow Central even possessed its 
own symphony orchestra, two choruses, and one folk orchestra.50 Musical interest and 
appreciation were important to audiences, making up 60 percent of listener reasons for 
tuning into radio broadcasts.51 
 
Specialized broadcasts 
 In her report on the growth of Soviet broadcasting, Rose Ziglin argued that, “the 
immense growth of the cultural demands of the population since the Revolution makes 
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the radio one of the most important instrumentalities of the cultural revolution.”52 For this 
reason radio was not just limited to music and news but instead operated in such a way as 
to appeal to various interests and different subgroups in Soviet society. As was previously 
noted in the last decade, broadcasts were already becoming specific to the special needs 
of labor. Ziglin herself mentions the broadcasts that are prepared for the kolkhoz, noting 
that a one-hour daily broadcast is dedicated to literature, agrotechnical information, and 
news about current campaigns.53 Farmers were not the only ones to have pieces of 
literature read to them over the air. Most broadcasts around the country contained some 
form of theatrical performances or serialized and condensed novels recorded by readers’ 
brigades, including the adventure tales of foreign authors such as H.G. Wells and Jules 
Verne. Educational programs often aired to appeal to a variety of interests on topics as 
diverse as natural science, psychology, art history, party/current politics, mathematics, 
physics, and travel, to name a few. Musical education programs began with a lecture on 
music appreciation and a talk with Soviet composers.54 To encourage physical education 
and fitness, a morning sport program got listeners to stand up, count, and do exercises.55 
Any of these programs were seen by the regime as “serving the cultural needs of the 
toilers and establishing for them a pleasant, sensible recreation.”56 
 Children were also an audience in which Soviet authorities saw as important 
enough to develop special broadcasts. These programs attempted to appeal to children 
based on the issues of contemporary youth and in Ziglin’s words, to “devote attention to 
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new ethics and morality.”57 Often broadcasting in the early morning, broadcasts for 
preschool-aged children featured fairy tales and other stories usually with accompanying 
musical backgrounds.58 As children got older there were other programs created that 
strengthened and supplemented what was being learned in school or were designed to 
develop inventive interests and foster creativity. Personalities such as “Professor 
Brainteaser” challenged students to think outside the box while other programs thrilled 
schoolchildren with stories of spies and other excitement. Most of these programs were 
broadcast for an hour and usually twice a day. For orphans, radio offered a link with a 
society in which they had never been fully a part. As one child put it, “our ‘window on 
the world’ was the classroom, the Pioneers, the radio in the red corner, and [the 
newspaper] ‘Pioneer’s Truth.’”59 Even though these programs appealed to listener 
interests beyond the more traditional TASS-censored information, it nevertheless was 
heavily controlled and broadcast for specific reasons. Ziglin believed that: 
The close cooperation of the radio commission with the governmental organs on 
the one hand, and its close association with the masses of radio listeners on the 
other hand, aid the radio commissions in fulfilling their responsible duties in the 
cause of lifting the cultural standard of the toiling masses to a higher place and 
educating the population of the Soviet Union in the spirit of conscious builders of 
a new, classless society.60 
 
The rhetoric here harkens back to Lenin’s emphasis on culture and its links with public 
enlightenment. Without public opinion polling it is difficult to know whether these 
programs appealed to the interests of the average listener or simply failed to draw in 
audiences. 
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News and Information 
 Despite the preponderance of music and other cultural programs, the broadcasting 
of news and information perhaps remains the most important aspect of Soviet radio. 
While broadcasting was still defining itself in the 1930s, radio remained a major vehicle 
for official policies and the communist worldview. According to historian Mark Hopkins, 
under Stalin the Soviet people were a “gray and malleable mass” to be “sculpted by the 
press.”61 Very much like print sources, radio had to be listened to with a critical ear if one 
wanted to gain an understanding of the truth and this usually meant reading in between 
the lines. As one expatriate put it, “First, if the paper says that something is white, he is 
almost sure that it is black. Second, he asks himself the question, ‘why are the authorities 
telling me this?’”62 The overwhelming majority of respondents who lived under the 
Stalinist system and were interviewed as part of the Harvard Interview Project noted their 
inherent mistrust of radio news and information. In most cases, listeners could recognize 
the discrepancy between what was being reported and the reality around them. The same 
respondent quoted earlier admitted that he listened to the speeches of Stalin over the radio 
in order to get a sense of which way the government was leaning and to become 
acquainted with official policies but turned the radio off whenever minor officials or 
other news was aired.63 Hopkins argued that “trust” and “belief” were the greatest losses 
suffered by the press during the Stalin years.64 
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Systematic listening to Soviet radio often revealed more information than reading 
the paper as it flat out spoke about subjects not mentioned in newspapers. It may have 
been that it was safer for the regime to broadcast information rather than put it into print 
where it would be on file and hanging around in a library or archive.65 Big campaigns, 
those with a political basis, were usually spelled out over newspapers whereas smaller 
ones, such as the coordination of spare parts for industry, were broadcast over radio.66 
Another interviewee complained that listeners never knew the programs ahead of time, 
which meant that he had to sit through “propaganda speeches” while waiting for a good 
program to air.67 For these reasons many former Soviet citizens declared radio to be 
immensely boring, droning on about subjects of little interest to most listeners. This was a 
notorious problem with the wired loudspeakers, as listeners had no way of changing the 
station or, in some cases, unable to turn it off entirely. City loudspeakers announced 
production figures for the kolkhoz and other propaganda figures about the recent harvest. 
In other cases, loudspeakers installed in the home were often connected with the factory 
receiving set; bringing the same information meant for the workplace into one’s living 
space.68  
Audience studies conducted during the 1920s disappeared under the traditional 
and more conservative policies of Stalin along with most forms of sociological research. 
There were not any public opinion polls on listener interests; radio was by-and-large a 
one-way form of communication.69 The only forms of audience studies were in the form 
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of mass observation of crowd response to public loudspeakers by party authorities. 
Broadcasts destined for the factory were specifically designed to stimulate higher 
production and radio was recruited for the First Five-Year Plan to assist Stalin’s call for 
rapid industrialization. Workplace radio even became a participatory medium as ordinary 
people were brought to the microphone for the first time. Workers were asked to make 
statements about the work they were doing as well as their future goals. While finding 
this type of domestic news boring, many listeners preferred international news and 
information about foreign countries. One of the few polls of listeners undertaken in 1940 
noted a call for more variety in songs, more foreign broadcasts, radio debates, and 
information on everyday living.70 The interest in life outside of the Soviet Union was 
already observable in some of the earliest radio amateurs and would remain a fixture of 
Soviet audiences until the era of glasnost in the 1980s. 
 As mentioned earlier, the development of tape recording in this period meant that 
radio could be taken places it had never been. One of these places was inside the 
courtroom. Parts of the Moscow Show Trials of 1937 were broadcast over the airwaves 
including Andrey Vyshinsky’s speeches for the prosecution.71 John Scott, an American 
worker in the Soviet Union, recalled the public trial of a factory director accused of 
“wrecking” industry by embezzling funds, the most important speeches of the 
proceedings were broadcast over radio.72 Radio offered the opportunity to give listeners 
an idea of the severity of crimes facing the accused as well as confirmation of the 
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“dangers” that existed among enemies of Soviet labor. On-the-scene reporting from 
exotic places, on the other hand, could bring excitement or a sense of adventure to the 
homes of ordinary people in the 1930s. Broadcasts of Soviet achievers such as mountain 
climbers, icebreaker skippers, airmen, and Stakhanovites could be broadcast for the first 
time.73 Radio was a perfect fit to broadcast the pride in Soviet achievement and human 
daring. One such sketch by I.T. Spirin, a noted arctic pilot and aviation expert, discussed 
how the 1938 arctic expedition of Ivan Papanin overcame the harshness of the 
environment to create a dinner of powdered chicken cutlets. The act of mixing aviation 
fuel with the cutlets in order to cook them was a testament to Soviet resolve and 
ingenuity in the midst of extreme conditions. The broadcast boasted that, “not a single 
restaurant, not a single menu offered dishes like those we invented then.”74 Radio brought 
these instances of Soviet achievement home to the nation as never before seen. Listeners 
could share the pride and gain the appreciation for their country’s success in ways never 
before possible. Perfect for a regime looking to toast its own accomplishments and 
inspire loyalty. 
 
Radio and the Stalin Cult 
 The years of Joseph Stalin brought not only widespread economic and social 
change to the Soviet Union but they also saw new forms of political control which were 
to become associated with communist regimes around the world. Stalin’s cult of 
personality has been widely studied and is often cited as a textbook aspect of totalitarian 
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regimes.  It would also seem as if radio was used to support the cult as intensely as it was 
used to support the leader’s other initiatives. Stalin was clearly not the only leader in the 
20th century who recognized the potential of broadcasting as the development of radio 
can be directly related to the speed in which leader cults grew around the world. Radio 
was key to cult development since it could be controlled easily and it offered the 
opportunity for the leader’s voice to be heard by millions for the first time in history; 
often times this meant bringing that voice into the homes of private citizens. Personality 
cults had always thrived on a listener’s ability to be captivated by a speaker’s image, 
body language, and the forcefulness of his voice; radio simply expanded the audience 
several times over. Men like Hitler, Mussolini, and Roosevelt understood this opportunity 
and capitalized on it in much the way Stalin did. Roosevelt’s fireside chats could reach 
between 60 – 70 million listeners out of a population of 130 million at one of the bleakest 
times in American history. Jan Plamper’s recent monograph on the Stalin cult draws on 
the power of broadcasting: 
Because of the development of the radio, in theory the entire world could now 
hear Stalin’s, Hitler's, or Mussolini's voice in real time. This tectonic shift had an 
impact on how these leaders were represented in their cults. The representation of 
Stalin as calm and unmoving was deliberately juxtaposed to Hitler’s wild, 
“hysterical” body language… thus the semiotics of the modern personality cult 
became relational or entangled.75 
 
As will be made clear during World War II, the power of voice was an important way to 
bring people comfort or to draw them into the cult. In her diary entry dated December 6, 
1937, Galin Shtange, a professor’s wife and a member of the Soviet intelligentsia, noted: 
Stalin speaks very slowly and distinctly—extremely simply, So simply that each 
word penetrates into your consciousness and I think the man cannot be found who 
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would not be able to understand what he says. I really love that, I don't like high 
faluting, bombastic speeches that are aimed at creating an acoustic effect.76 
 
The last line, an obvious reference to Adolf Hitler, demonstrates how radio listeners 
could contrast the words of their leader and appreciate what made him unique and 
identifiably Russian. Radio’s ability to offer closeness with the leader to those in far-off 
places was instrumental in achieving this new brand of loyalty. Mass media 
communication, like radio, seems to have been almost tailor-made to the needs of the 20th 
century totalitarian regimes.  
 Radio’s ability to bring Stalin’s voice into the home and workplace was not the 
only way broadcasting was made to work for the personality cult. The image or the idea 
of radio could be used as a substitute for Stalin himself or a way to demonstrate the effect 
he had on others. As mentioned earlier, Arctic explorers were some of the standard 
images of Soviet heroes who battled against and overcame incredible odds. The 
expedition of Papanin exemplifies this phenomenon as news reports explained how the 
crew, huddled around their radio at the pole, were “warmed by Stalin-like care.” An 
article dated May 24, 1938 explained that: 
Yesterday evening there was the extraordinary picture of a meeting of the 30 
members of the leading unit of the expedition on the ice at the pole, listening to 
the reading of a telegram of greetings from the leaders of the party and 
government. They gathered under the open sky, in a snowstorm, but felt no cold 
because the bright words and the anxious care of the great Stalin warmed them 
and they sensed the glowing breath of their beloved homeland.77 
 
This concept of presence-in-absence was also used in Soviet art and other visual sources. 
It was not uncommon in the later years of the Stalin regime to see radio used as a stand-in 
for the man himself. The device, with citizens gathered around the receiver, could be an 
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allusion or metaphor to Stalin through the “shining faces of radio listeners.” Plamper 
believes this replacement might have functioned as preparing the Soviet people for his 
death.78 While this is speculation, what is certain is that radio brought a sense of 
closeness to the regime that had not existed in the earliest Bolshevik days and formed a 
major component of the Stalin cult. The leader was no longer a picture in the newspaper 
or just another name living behind the walls of the Kremlin. Before the invention of 
television, radio was the vehicle that brought the listener into the cult. For the first time, 
Stalin was speaking to the citizen, offering them words of encouragement, and telling 
them what they most needed to hear.  
 
Broadcasting Dangers 
 Few things in the Stalinist Thirties were without fear of running afoul of the party, 
arrest, or worse, and radio was certainly not immune. As seen in the previous period, the 
work of radio broadcasters was often unattractive. Overwork was a persistent issue and 
technical support and technicians were weak and usually poorly educated. Broadcasters 
had to work hard and imaginatively to develop effective ways of reaching their audience. 
By the end of 1934, slips of the tongue and on-air glitches could automatically be 
interpreted as counterrevolutionary sabotage.79 As in other countries, announcers were 
traditionally required to shed their accent and in the Soviet Union this also meant 
avoiding provincialism and other errors in stress. Stephen Lovell believes that: 
The task of a radio presenter in the 1930’s was unenviable. There were so many 
pitfalls to avoid: “bourgeois” rhetoric, “aristocratic” declamation, staginess in all 
its manifestations. It was not clear how the requirements for a “proletarian” style 
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of delivery could be made compatible with the rigorous high-cultural standards 
that obtained in public discourse.80 
 
Tape recording was a blessing for this very reason as it meant that editing could give 
broadcasting more fluency and clarity. In most cases broadcasters were better off playing 
it safe and prerecording broadcasts whenever possible. Prerecorded broadcasts became 
the norm up until the war and those programs that still ran live interviews were usually 
heavily scripted. Soviet children’s author Lev Kassil argued that “no form of art and 
propaganda gets so much harsh criticism as radio. A newspaper sits there at home and 
stays silent until you open it, but radio invades all the crevices of your mind and you 
notice even the slightest slip and find it offensive.”81 
 One of the greatest dangers for those listeners with wireless sets was the lore of 
foreign radio. Standard sets with shortwave capabilities could pick up any number of 
stations broadcasting from countries outside the Soviet Union, mostly in the West. The 
phenomenon of foreign broadcasting will be investigated in greater depth in Chapter 3 
but needs to be given a cursory glance during the later Stalin years when tuning in to non-
Soviet sources of information was a very real possibility for some radio owners. 
Listening was never officially declared illegal but any taint of foreign influence or 
suspicion on the part of the NKVD would be enough to warrant arrest. One former 
prisoner believed that in his camp at Kharkov, 2 – 3% of all prisoners were there for 
listening to foreign broadcasting.82 Another respondent in the Harvard Interview Project, 
who used to visit his boss’s house in 1939 to listen to foreign stations, did so by keeping 
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the volume low and placing dark coverings over the windows. He acknowledged that if 
he had been caught the standard punishment was ten years hard labor and confiscation of 
his radio.83 German broadcasts were among the most popular foreign stations to pick up 
if a listener knew the language. One interviewee would find out about the war by 
listening to Hitler’s speeches about victory in France following the Nazi-Soviet Pact. In 
the years immediately after the pact, Soviet citizens could openly listen to German 
programs since the propaganda coming from their stations was primarily anti-English and 
not anti-Soviet. Often a listener could find out more about the war from outside stations 
than they could by listening to official broadcasts. Anti-Soviet broadcasts could be picked 
up with greater frequency following the Finnish War. The same respondent would listen 
to the Tehran station as it would play music not typically heard in Russia.84 
 
Radio’s Wartime Service 
 “Comrades, citizens, brothers and sisters, men of our Army and Navy! My words 
are addressed to you, dear friends!” Such were the opening lines of Stalin’s radio address 
to the Soviet people on July 3, 1941 and indeed his words were addressed to the nation 
like never before. Hitler’s invasion of the USSR had begun just twelve days earlier and 
this was the first time the Russian people heard their leader’s voice on the matter; for 
some, this was the moment they first learned their country was at war. In the course of 
this twelve-minute address, Stalin attempted to rally his people behind the government, 
using words such as “brothers and sisters” to denote a common war effort. The broadcast 
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would be an important sign of later wartime imagery by reminding listeners of historic 
Russian battles against invaders such as Napoleon and Kaiser Wilhelm II, appealing to 
nationalism rather than party ideology. Calling for the whole nation to be placed on a war 
footing, Stalin’s address would mark the beginning of a long period of suffering and 
sacrifice for the Soviet people. This speech would also start a new period for radio as a 
medium to unite the nation in new and dramatic ways. Previous rules and rigid censors 
were to be abandoned and patriotic camaraderie fostered. Rumor, doubt, and confusion 
would be hallmarks of the next four years but one thing was clear – radio had been called 
up for duty.85 
Stephen Lovell argues that the acquisition of radio proficiency is an important 
part of a country gearing up for war.86 If this is the case, then everything we have seen so 
far suggests that the Soviet Union may or may not have been ready to meet the challenge 
of the Nazis. One of the first acts on the part of the Soviet government was to requisition 
all standard wireless radio receivers. The Germans had already been broadcasting anti-
Soviet propaganda in the occupied Russian territories and the regime was sure to put 
themselves in a position to control all wartime information in lands still under their 
control. By 1945, only 473,000 sets out of the prewar total of 1.1 million were still in 
operation, mostly for party use.87 Unfortunately for set owners, no documents were 
provided upon requisition so no one could prove ownership after the war had ended.88 
Only wired sets were allowed in the Soviet-controlled areas thanks largely to the reasons 
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spelled out in Chapter 1, namely: greater reliability and less vulnerability to enemy 
propaganda (the regime could be assured they knew what their people were hearing and 
that critical information was not being broadcast to the German enemy). In fact, 
possession of a wireless receiver in German-occupied territory was punishable by death.  
Despite these early actions, radio failed most listeners in the early months of the 
war. The State Radio Committee failed to enact wartime reforms and as a result 
broadcasts could not keep up with the rapid pace of this war.89 In the earliest phase of the 
conflict, radio played up patriotic themes but otherwise did not so much as mention the 
war. Without the ability to broadcast without Moscow’s approval, republic and local 
stations were unable to report German attacks to the center. Radiofication had come a 
long way by 1940 but service was still inadequate in many parts of the country. In major 
cities there were sixty-seven receivers per every 1,000 people, in the countryside that 
number dropped to eight, and in non-Slavic republics it was only three.90 Broadcasting 
reforms were eventually enacted and as seen in Stalin’s July 1941 address, radio provided 
the opportunity to link people, the state, and their leader into one. The airways were soon 
reorganized to link the front and the rear, occupied and freed zones, besieged cities and 
the capital in a united spirit of adversity and common danger. A new Informbiuro was 
created to streamline the process of censorship and allow for rapid relay of fast-breaking 
news91. Radio Moscow provided 18½ hours of programming at the height of war with 
bulletin updates every forty-five minutes. The new formula devoted equal time to news 
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and cultural programs.  This effect was undoubtedly known to the Germans as Luftwaffe 
bomber pilots marked radio stations as prime targets in both Moscow and Leningrad. 
World War II solidified the place of radio in Soviet culture as people for the first 
time relied on it every day. Radio became a space of comfort and inspiration for a people 
looking to feel connected and the voice of Moscow as supreme political and military 
authority let citizens know that government endured and the defense of the motherland 
continued. Radio provided a powerful cultural media especially as theaters, movies, and 
concert halls closed down and broadcasting became the prime medium for citizens to turn 
towards. Apart from updates about the war effort, broadcasts of Russian literature, 
poems, and history were greatly expanded. With the Nazi invasion came renewal of 
patriotic imagery and radio reminded people about the nation’s glorious past. Radio 
lectures on past Russian victories and heroes were common and included lessons on 
Kutusov, the Battle of Borodino, the Invasion of 1812, and Aleksandr Nevskii, to name a 
few. War and Peace, one of the great Russian works of literature, was serialized over 
radio throughout the war. Tolstoy’s iconic work about Russian culture in the face of the 
Napoleonic invasion was a fitting symbol for a people beleaguered by another foreign 
invasion. Classic writers, the likes of Dostoyevsky and Pushkin, were also given their due 
over radio. High culture was seen as a national treasure that belonged to the masses and 
that needed to be protected from the German hordes. As Richard Stites put it, “Radio 
listeners heard the musical and dramatic classics of Russian culture and Western 
civilization in a promotion of Russian nationalism and allied solidarity against 
barbarism.”92 Contemporary authors espousing the spirit and cultural determination of the 
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nation were also brought to the public’s attention. Konstantin Simonov’s “Wait for Me” 
appeared over the airwaves in 1941 and would be replayed throughout the course of the 
war and recited by some as if it were a prayer: 
Wait for me, and I'll come back!  
Wait with all you've got!  
Wait, when dreary yellow rains  
Tell you, you should not.  
Wait when snow is falling fast,  
Wait when summer's hot,  
Wait when yesterdays are past,  
Others are forgot.  
Wait, when from that far-off place,  
Letters don't arrive.  
Wait, when those with whom you wait   
Doubt if I'm alive.93 
 
Simonov was the voice for thousands of soldiers and other loved ones who did not know 
how the war would end, nor where they would be when it did. Broadcasts of these works 
helped to reshape national identity by “fusing information, culture, and emotionalism into 
a picture of a just and martyred people beleaguered by the evil force.”94 
Perhaps one of the most important roles radio played during the war was in 
Leningrad during the hard blockade winter of 1941 – 1942. As the Germans strangled the 
city and its residents faced the reality of a Russian winter without heat and food, 
Leningrad radio continued to broadcast. With thousands dying of starvation around them 
and the situation appearing bleak, tuning into the city’s radio let residents know that 
people were still there and the resistance continued. Olga Berggolts’s poem 
“Conversation with a Neighbor” first read over radio fortified the spirit of the city in the 
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midst of the famine. Its words depict the hope and optimism that life will return to normal 
and the war will end: 
Dariya Vlasievna, wait a little: 
The day will come when from the sky 
The last alert will howl its warning, 
The last all-clear ring out on high. 
 
And how remote and dimly distant  
The war will seem to us that day 
We casually remove the shutters 




Dariya Vlasieva, by your spirit 
The whole wide world renowned shall be. 
The name of that spirit is Russia. 
Stand and be bold then, even as She.95 
 
 One of the great acts of patriotism to come out of the Leningrad blockade was the 
playing of Shostakovich’s Seventh Symphony, written specifically for and about the 
besieged city. Musicians risked their lives and in some cases left their posts to perform 
the eighty-minute piece live over Radio Leningrad for the first time in the winter of 1942. 
The piece as well as its performance was said to have reflected triumph over fascism and 
the faith in humanism and light.96 Not every broadcast in Leningrad was positive and 
filled with confidence; in fact some of the most powerful programs were those expressing 
sorrow, letting listeners know they were not alone in their anguish. In the city and all 
throughout Russia, ordinary people were handed microphones to share their outrage and 
personal thoughts on the German invasion or to let husbands and sons fighting on the 
front know that their families were safe; by May of 1943, 3,000 soldiers on the Leningrad 
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front had spoken on radio.97 These individual contributions and heartfelt emotions were 
unlike anything seen over radio in the previous two decades and brought to radio a more 
authentic popular voice. 
 The sense of reassurance that broadcasting provided was not unique to Leningrad, 
but could be felt throughout the country. Many listeners tuned into broadcasts to hear 
familiar voices like Yury Levitan, the voice of Radio Moscow. Levitan’s deep rich timbre 
offered an “overtone of reassurance” and an “undertone of paternal authority” – he was 
also the first man Hitler promised to hang after the capture of Moscow.98  In many ways, 
the stiff programming of early years had given way to spontaneous interviews and 
extraordinary public outpourings. One of the most popular and useful services radio 
provided was the reading of letters received by Radio Moscow to and from front-line 
soldiers. By the end of the war, 2,000 letters had been received and through careful 
selection and censorship some 9,000 broadcasts delivered the words of loved words 
throughout the nation.99 Radio also provided updated addresses for civilians who had 
either been evacuated or displaced in an attempt to connect loved ones who had been 
separated by the war. This practice continued after 1945 and acted almost as a missing 
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Conclusion  
Never before had there been such bonding of the Soviet people to the media as 
there was during the Great Patriotic War. Stalin himself declared the first Radio Day on 
May 7, 1945 to officially recognize the wartime contribution of radio and its importance 
to the Russian people at a time of absolute desperation. Radio had shed most of the 
formalities and stifling rigidity of the early Stalin years and came into its own during the 
war. The administration had shed its ambivalence to popular tastes and set about forging 
a connection between core and periphery that was essential to maintaining civilian 
support. As the actor Vladimir Iakhontov succinctly put it: 
Living without listening to the radio was impossible. Radio informed, signaled 
and guided us, kept kin and loved ones linked together. The voice that said 
“Dateline Moscow” grabbed listeners’ attention, comforted them, instilled hope in 
them. People listened to it all over the country, thousands of miles away.100 
 
Unfortunately for the Soviet people, much of the wartime freedom and policy relaxation 
was forgotten in the postwar period and radio was no different. By 1946, station numbers, 
power, and total receivers had been restored to prewar levels, as was Stalinist rigidity. It 
is impossible to deny that radio saw significant expansion and change throughout the 
period though with central control oblivious to popular tastes most listeners saw little 
purpose in accommodating radio into their lives. The exception to this was the war, when 
other aspects of traditional life collapsed around them, the regime turned to broadcasting 
to unite people behind a culture worth saving. What is certain is that radio had proven 
itself and found a new place in hearts of those who listened. As the postwar period began, 
the medium was being prepped for significant expansion and further retooling that would 
see radio take the mantle of preferred party media. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Opportunity and Reality: Broadcasting in Postwar Russia 
 
 
 The Soviet Union in the postwar years can be defined both by how much change 
the nation underwent and yet how much it stayed the same. As detailed in the last 
chapter, radio underwent significant adjustments throughout much of the 1930s followed 
by a complete overhaul during the war. In many ways Soviet authorities recognized the 
ability of radio broadcasting to be at the forefront of mass media and information 
dissemination. As Pravda boasted in May 1953, “our country is the birthplace of all the 
most outstanding discoveries and inventions in the field of radio, such as radar, radio 
navigation, television, radio acoustics and the use of high-frequency currents in the 
national economy.”1 Obvious falsehoods but these boastings demonstrate the way in 
which authorities had committed to the expansion of radio technology. Following the 
death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 and the start of liberalization under Khrushchev, 
radiofication was intensified and the number of sets available reached numbers that were 
on par with those of western nations. Yet with the expansion of wireless transmitters with 
shortwave capabilities came the increased capability of listening into broadcasts from 
foreign nations, some directly aimed at disseminating anti-Soviet propaganda. As the 
airways increasingly became a battleground in the Cold War, Soviet authorities were 
forced to take steps in order to curb the enthusiasm and for foreign broadcasting. Some of 
these measures brought greater reforms to domestic broadcasting though the effectiveness 
of such changes remain in debate. In the regime’s final years, Soviet radio, like much of 
the system, would be impacted by the policies of glasnost and perestroika. The degree to 
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which radio opened the regime up to the kinds of criticism that hastened its demise can be 
argued though it seems fair to say that the possibilities of broadcasting never caught up 
with the realties for Soviet audiences. 
 
“Communications Explosion”  
 For the great majority of Soviet citizens, it was radio that first informed them of 
the death of Stalin. As the country and the people he oppressed wept for him, great 
changes were already underway as the Soviet Union was becoming much more 
modernized in the postwar world than it had been in the years leading up to the war. In 
the words of Gayle Durham Hollander, the Soviet Union underwent a “communications 
explosion” in the years after Stalin’s death and radio was part of this new vanguard.2 In 
the 1950s radio had progressed significantly from its less than humble origins thirty years 
earlier, but it was still moving uphill in comparison with other industrialized nations. It 
was not until the early 1950s that the Soviet Union reached the levels of radio 
broadcasting seen in the United States in the 1930s. In 1959, Izvestia was reporting that 
broadcasting-central, republic, and local was supplying over 580 hours of broadcasting 
daily in 58 languages of the USSR. By 1952, the Soviet Union was operating 125 
broadcasting stations with 100 receivers on average for every 1,000 people while that 
number was around 200 in Europe and 500 per 1,000 in the United States.3 By the 1960s, 
radiofication had become not only a high priority goal of the regime but also a keyword 
of “socialist modernity.” 
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 In their attempt to increase access to radio, Soviet authorities concentrated on the 
growth in the number of available wireless sets. As had been the case in the past, 
transistor radios were traditionally in demand; they were consumer items, status symbols, 
and one of the first luxuries a Soviet citizen was willing to buy even over more essential 
items like bicycles and sewing machines. Wireless sets were also becoming cheaper to 
make, were generally more reliable, and most importantly, they avoided the need to string 
expensive telegraph wire and commit the resources necessary for the expansion of the 
loudspeaker network; electricity was no longer a prerequisite for listening to radio. By 
1953, there were 21 million receiving sets in the Soviet Union, 7.2 million were wireless 
sets. The number of radios confiscated and brought back from Germany in the years after 
the surrender may account for a small part of this increase.4 By 1955, the country was 
producing more wireless sets yearly than had existed in the entirety of prewar Russia.  
Radio ownership had reached near saturation levels by the early 1960s. By 1968 
the total number of sets available was calculated at around 85.5 million and by 1970 at 95 
million.5 Annual sales of radios in 1950 were ten times higher than they had been in 
1940.6 This was likely impacted by the drop in prices for transistor radios to between 70 
– 100 rubles. As a result of these trends, in 1963 wireless sets outnumbered wired 
reproducers for the first time in the history of Soviet radio.7 While the growth of 
transistor sets would only continue, the loudspeaker network continued to expand; in fact, 
radio speakers were still found in workplaces up into the 1990s. Rural areas continued to 
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remain outside the pale though the gap was noticeably decreasing. In 1950, one-fifth of 
loudspeakers could be found in the villages whereas that number grew to one-half by 
1956 – this is also a testament to the growth of wireless sets in the more urbanized areas 
of the Soviet Union.8 Reports note that more than half of collectivized farms were 
without radios in the areas of Azerbaijan, Latvia, Moldavia, and Kirgizia.9 Articles 
frequently appeared in Pravda complaining of the lack of fulfillment of radiofication in 
rural villages. One such article complains that the radio installation plan for the first 
quarter of 1958 was only 54 percent fulfilled. The reasons can be traced back to shortages 
of steel wire used in building relay lines among other causes.10 All indications however 
suggest that radio was almost as accessible to the rural population as newspaper.  
 Since the inception of Soviet broadcasting, radio had always taken a backseat to 
the information medium most preferred by the party hierarchy, print. As discussed 
earlier, the print culture was not without its problems. In the 1960s Soviet authorities 
believed that news should be transmitted to the population faster. As a result, radio was 
given the go ahead to release information before it appeared in Pravda. This new 
recognition of the power and status of radio was a tremendous turning point in the history 
of Soviet broadcasting. The general news structure remained unchanged as information 
continued to be heavily propagandized and slow to clear the censors but TASS reports 
were given permission to go out over radio first. This fact appears to be even more 
impressive amidst the growth of television. Like radio, television underwent a process of 
expansion and improvement in the 1960s but was hampered by many of the same 
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problems that plagued radio in its earliest years. As a newer medium, television repeated 
information that had already appeared elsewhere, was limited to a small audience of 
people who could afford TV sets, and was caught up with the same fundamental question 
that pestered radio--was its purpose to inform or to entertain? 
  
Audience 
One rather abrupt change from the previous period was the resumption of public 
opinion polling. Under Stalin, the press was a one-way form of communication with little 
to no reciprocal interests in tastes or opinions. Following Khrushchev’s 1956 “Secret 
Speech” denouncing Stalinism, public opinion polling was reintroduced by the state. A 
1960 survey undertaken to assess and compare media deemed radio superior in its speed 
of delivering the news.11 Despite polling, most feedback on radio was gathered 
informally by reading the letters sent to broadcasting stations from their listeners; in 1958 
alone, Izvestia reported that there were over 400,000 letters sent to central broadcasting.12 
All of these sources are especially useful in helping to understand radio audiences since 
their voice had largely went unheard. One of the great difficulties in fully realizing the 
extent of broadcasting in the early years is the simple complaint of a lack of source 
material. Broadcasts were not traditionally recorded and listener reactions and 
preferences were ignored; this fact accounts for much of the speculation in earlier 
chapters. In the post-Stalin years this picture becomes more in focus thanks to these 
surveys as well as western interviews with current and former listeners.  
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 Especially useful in regards to this line of information was an understanding of 
audience trends. One of the prime reasons for radio’s recognition as preferred party 
communication almost certainly stemmed from the increase in listenership. On average, 
around 80 percent of citizens were listening to radio for at least an hour per day. One of 
the unique things about radio is that it can be regarded as both a primary and a secondary 
activity. The act of reading a newspaper requires almost total focus that would constitute 
a primary activity much the way actively listening to radio would. Unlike the paper 
however, radio can also be “listened” to in the background while one attends to other 
tasks, thus radio becomes a secondary activity. The latter was most commonly the case 
with housewives, retired persons, and others who traditionally stayed at home during the 
course of the day. As a result, women figure a bit higher in the overall radio audience. 
According to information gathered from Radio Liberty surveys, the amount of time most 
people listened daily with their full attention was around six minutes whereas the number 
increased significantly to thirty-six minutes as a secondary activity.13 Around 17 percent 
of surveyed people said they traditionally mixed housework with radio listening.14  
 Surveys and interviews conducted around this time reveal interesting trends in 
both audience and listening habits that were not available in previous periods. As would 
likely come as no surprise, peak listening hours were in the morning between 6AM and 
9AM as well as in the evening from 5PM to 12AM. These times reflect listening trends 
for major urban areas such as Moscow and Leningrad and correspond with working shifts 
for the average laborer. The hours between 7PM and 9PM had the highest rate of 
listenership with 42.7% of respondents admitting listening to radio. Foreign radio 
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broadcasting was most active at night especially around the midnight hours, which may 
account for listeners in the late evening.15 Skilled laborers tended to listen longer than 
unskilled laborers, 42 minutes compared with 30 minutes respectively.16 These numbers 
are also consistent with overall listenership among various social groups. According to 
information obtained from personal interviews with western sociologists, skilled workers 
represented one of broadcasting’s largest audiences as 22 percent of respondents 
identified radio as their most important source of information. Radio’s second and third 
largest subgroups were collective farm peasants (18%) and ordinary workers (14%) and 
the intelligentsia and white-collar employees rounding out the bottom spots (both at 
9%).17  
In looking at these numbers an inverse trend is revealed between education and 
radio listenership; as a listener’s level of education increases the importance of radio 
decreases. Respondents with higher levels of education were more prone to cite 
newspapers as their primary source of information. Perhaps people with higher education 
prefer to read the articles and take charge of what information they read rather than to 
simply digest whatever news broadcasters send out. Radio also fits better in the early 
mornings and late evenings when a laborer’s schedule is already so filled.  
 
Content  
 The postwar years brought both interesting changes to radio content as well as 
maintained standard practices that had been seen in earlier periods. Soviet authorities 
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continued to view broadcasting as a way in which to encourage acceptance of national 
goals as well as form a particular Soviet culture by elevating public tastes. Even by the 
1960s there were not any verbatim monitoring reports of Soviet broadcasts and thus it 
remains hard to know the different types of news featured over the airways. Domestic 
news was largely overweighed with either party and government information or the 
publicizing of economic achievements. This constant droning on about repeat news and 
information was probably the reason why so many listeners saw radio as persistently dull. 
An article in Sovetskaya kultura from May 1957 noted that at least fifteen broadcasts of 
“latest news” come from Moscow daily yet these are some of the most criticized by 
listeners. The author that, “not infrequently the information broadcast is made up of 
fortuitous matters of little significance, which gives a very pale reflection of our eventful 
life. In a recent broadcast of the “latest news” by the all-Union radio, there were 11 items 
devoted to the day’s events in the USSR. It was quite a broadcast: all the items had to do 
with conferences and meetings!”18 
According to an article appearing in Izvestia in 1959, 18 of the 66 hours of 
broadcasting daily were devoted to political programs (news, commentaries on domestic 
and foreign issues, press reviews, and statements by workers and collective farmers). The 
article boasted that central broadcasting provided as much material as five or six central 
newspapers the size of Izvestia.19 News that would have been of interest in other 
countries such as reports on crime or other accidents were rarely broadcast in the Soviet 
Union, as it would have been an embarrassment for officials; most listeners would have 
to rely on rumors or other word of mouth communication to gain such information. As 
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discussed in the previous chapter, many listeners preferred international news and 
information about foreign countries that was still in short supply when compared with 
domestic coverage. Few foreign correspondents appeared on central radio and 
information on other countries was always presented in a way that illustrated Soviet 
policies, such as reporting on worker strikes or other revolutionary activities in areas such 
as Latin America and Africa. Information on the United States and other western 
European countries would generally serve to highlight the imperialist tendencies of 
capitalist nations.20 
 Music continued to be a major reason for listening to both national and foreign 
radio. The postwar years saw a 50 percent increase in the amount of music being 
broadcast, still traditionally classical music and operas from around the world. One 
nationalist complaint immediately following the war was that there was not enough 
native Russian music being played, too much Bach and Puccini and not enough 
Tchaikovsky and Mussorgsky.21 By the 1950s, Soviet audiences were more interested in 
jazz and other styles coming from the west, so much so that music was among the 
primary reasons that listeners sought out western broadcasts. National broadcasting was 
also allowing listeners to make choices for the first time as well. With the growth of 
wireless sets, listeners could choose the volume and the station for the first time. Starting 
in 1963, Radio Moscow offered two different programming channels. A few years later 
that number jumped to four: Programs 1 and 2 offered various news and information as 
well as commentaries on a host of other topics, Program 3 was largely devoted to music 
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and literature, and Program 4 being a mixture and intended for audiences in the far 
eastern part of the country. Children’s programs continued and even saw a sizeable jump 
after the war. The average Soviet child was devoting sixteen hours a week to 
broadcasting by the mid 1960s, a steep rise from just six hours during the 1930s.22  
 
Local Broadcasting 
 While central broadcasting certainly gets a lot of attention, local broadcasting 
inside the Soviet Union filled its part of the airways. As seen in previous chapters, local 
stations often lacked the resources and the personnel to fully embrace the potential of 
radio. Local broadcasting was a frequent target of criticism and not always for reasons 
within their control. Radio Moscow took precedence among the Soviet airways and local 
stations were relegated to a supporting role. In general, local stations were allotted few 
broadcasting minutes as they traditionally aired during times when they interfered less 
with Moscow Central. In many cases, these programs were largely a rebroadcast of 
national news and may have added fuel to the larger complaint of broadcasting 
redundancy. Due in part to censorship policies, local stations were forbidden from 
commenting on something until Moscow had spoken first; often this meant that local 
news was extremely slow in reaching its audience. If a natural disaster or some other 
event occurred in a region, local radio would be silent until given the official line from 
the capital.  
Lastly, amateurism was another complaint leveled against the staff of local 
stations and this comes from general inexperience and insufficient staffing in these areas. 
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In his private journal of March 27, 1937, collective farmer Ignat Danilovich Frolov 
lampoons the Kalinin local radio news by calling out the regional and district authorities, 
calling them “utterly negligent” in their selection of broadcasting staff. 
Mispronunciations and lack of professionalism were unacceptable in his eyes, including 
the misreading of the word “leader” as “cheater” and “army commander” as “enemy 
commander.”23 While such slipups may seem innocent and inconsequential, the general 
inconsistency between local conditions and what was reported, combined with overall 
boredom, virtually assured smaller listening audiences for local programming. 
 
“Enemy Voices” 
 By far the most important aspect of postwar radio was the phenomenon of foreign 
broadcasting to the Soviet Union. One of the few topics in the history of Russian radio 
that has seen significant scholarship, foreign broadcasts were often understood as a 
battleground in the propaganda campaign of the larger Cold War. So large was the 
audience for radio that historian Maury Lisann believed that radio broadcasting 
accounted for more communication between the communist and non-communist worlds 
than “all forms of private and laboriously negotiated intergovernmental exchanges 
combined.”24 Soviet authorities were notably concerned about these “enemy voices” 
polluting their airways as shortwave broadcasting represented the only significant gap in 
the control of information inside the USSR. This concern began in February 1947 with 
the first Russian language broadcast of the Voice of America (VOA).  
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Dedicated to informing Soviet listeners about the style and quality of life inside 
the United States, VOA was certainly not the only western station vying for an audience 
behind the iron curtain. The growth of shortwave radios inside the USSR meant that 
listeners could tune into VOA, BBC, Radio Canada, Deutsche Welle, Israel Radio, Radio 
Monte Carlo, Radio Finland, Radio France, Trans-World, Radio Free Europe, Radio 
Italy, Radio Luxembourg, Radio Sweden, Radio Vatican, and Radio Liberty to name a 
few. By the late 1950s, sixty different foreign language stations were broadcasting to the 
Soviet Union. Programs generally needed to be broadcast in Russian to gain the widest 
audience as few citizens spoke western languages. Many Russians could and often did 
listen to Bulgarian and Romanian broadcasts, as the language was similar enough to 
understand. Some stations were known to broadcast in slow and simple speech in an 
effort to add listeners who were non-native speakers. It should also be said that Soviet 
authorities began their own foreign broadcasting service that grew at a faster pace than 
the domestic network. By 1968, Radio Moscow was beaming 150 hours of programming 
abroad in 57 languages. The impact and influence of these transmissions are beyond the 
scope of this paper and requires its own academic study. 
 While the state did not officially make listening to foreign radio was not officially 
made illegal, listeners still ran great risks when tuning into non-Soviet programming; as a 
result, the audience for these broadcasts makes for an interesting investigation. Who were 
these people? How often did they listen? Why did they listen? Why were their numbers 
so large? How did authorities respond and attempt to curb access to these voices? These 
questions get to the heart of foreign radio broadcasting by revealing its appeal and 
simultaneously providing insight into the shortcomings of domestic broadcasting. The 
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subject also offers a fascinating perspective into “resistance” to the regime and whether 
tuning into the VOA and other stations like it was really an act of rebellion against the 
system or merely harmless curiosity. Whatever the case, there is no denying that much 
can be learned. 
 Since most citizens rarely admitted to hearing VOA, Radio Liberty, and others, it 
is extremely difficult to know the size of the audience and their listening preferences. 
With that said, there are notable trends that are identifiable from western interviews with 
Soviet listeners in later years. Due to the perils of listening to foreign broadcasts, many 
listeners would only listen in groups of two or three – anything more was too large and 
too dangerous. These groups would keep the volume on their radio dials way down while 
hanging sheets over the windows to blanket out any light and sound. Such danger existed 
that others kept their radio sets dismantled or unable to receive shortwave from abroad 
when they were not in use. Engineers and other specialists could get away with having 
radio parts scattered about their workshop while friends and investigators were none the 
wiser. Most often these groups would assemble at night when shortwave reception was 
better as the peak hours for VOA were after 11PM. Other times these small groups would 
rotate in and out of listening to the set and discuss what they heard after they were done. 
The dissemination of information heard over these broadcasts was part of the reason 
outside information penetrated Soviet society the way in which it did. As one listener 
remembered, “those who listen to the radio would tell others and people simply soaked 
up these unofficial rumors. People who heard it would tell it to others and they would tell 
it again to others and increased in a geometric progression.”25 Much of this talk was 
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between friends and only in private circles; listeners would attack VOA and other 
programs when suspicious persons were around.26 
 Despite the apparent dangers, the audience for foreign radio was likely much 
higher than authorities realized. A 1965 investigation into public attitudes undertaken by 
the regime revealed the audience for outside broadcasting to be between 40 – 60 
million.27 This number is especially high and somewhat startling given the dangers linked 
with these enemy voices. Sociological surveys such as this one were the impetus behind 
media reform undertaken in the 1960s. Radio Liberty attempted its own informal survey 
with Soviet tourists traveling outside the country. The survey was far from scientific and 
thus makes it difficult to accurately assess the rates of Western radio listenership. The 
study maintained a heavy bias towards those citizens from upper socioeconomic 
backgrounds as they were the ones most likely to be traveling outside of the country, not 
to mention the spur of the moment style of interview. The survey was also skewed toward 
a higher number of party members as they maintained a higher proportion of travel visas. 
Despite these difficulties, Radio Liberty’s information provided an interesting picture by 
pegging the size of the audience for foreign radio at around 67.3 million with over 16 
million listening during the course of a year; the former reflects a total audience of 37% 
of the Soviet Union’s adult population!28 Between 1972 and 1988, the audience for Voice 
of America alone was estimated at around 13 million per week, approximately 15% of 
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the population with BBC and Radio Liberty averaging between 5 – 10% and Deutche 
Welle between 2 – 5%.29 
 Exactly who these listeners were is hard to tell but we can say that listening to 
western broadcasts was highest among college graduates. Eighty percent of Moscow 
University students were listening to foreign radio.30 Voice of America was one of the 
most popular stations among Soviet listeners as it provided insight into life in the United 
States, the quality of living, and provided access to western musical styles. The general 
audience for VOA was younger, often tuning in more for entertainment reasons. Radio 
Liberty was significantly more anti-Soviet with a clear and unmistakable propaganda 
message that gave commentaries and histories on communism and the great suffering 
caused by the Soviet regime. The average Radio Liberty listener was older, generally 
more educated and less urban.  
A cursory glance at these numbers could develop the false impression that the 
vast majority of listeners were turning to the bourgeois propagandists in open defiance of 
the regime. Despite impressive numbers, significant barriers to foreign radio listening 
remained. One respondent argued that the mass of the Soviet population was made up of 
collective farmers who worked too much and would never have had access to shortwave 
broadcasts. (He also believed that the best way to reach audiences would be to release 
balloons full of leaflets). The same respondent would not hear his first outside broadcast 
until he was away from land on a ship as part of a fishing fleet.31 For listeners who did 
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not know foreign languages, those programs that were not broadcast in Russian would 
have been inescapable barriers. It is also true that sets that could pick up shortwave 
transmissions were relatively expensive. Another respondent believed that few laborers 
were listening to stations like VOA because of their large families and the increased 
probability that one might tell on the family.32  
 
Reasons for Tuning into Foreign Radio 
Whatever obstacles did exist, broadcasts from outside the Soviet republics were 
reaching over a quarter of the adult population and all had different reasons for listening. 
As discussed earlier, the consequences for listening to non-official sources of information 
could be severe, so what compelled listeners to assume the risks and turn the dial to these 
foreign voices? One of the most important and widely cited reasons was simply to hear 
non-Soviet sources of information. As one listener said, “in order to hear the truth, one 
must listen to foreign news broadcasts.”33 According to Radio Liberty’s informal polling, 
77 percent of all respondents said they listened to western radio in order to hear the most 
recent information while another 70 percent said it was because the news they were 
interested in was unavailable inside the Soviet Union.34 Audiences also varied depending 
on what crises were going on in the globe. The bigger the event or the more it had the 
potential to affect Soviet lives, the more willing people were to supplement the news they 
were getting at home.  
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Timeliness was certainly a huge factor. Half the appeal of foreign broadcasting 
related to the inability of domestic news to provide faster news reporting due in large part 
to the time it took information to pass through the censors. Listeners to western radio 
learned, not only about news and information before it appeared in the Soviet press, but 
also that which would never appear. The term “sharp questions” came to refer to 
questions that listeners would develop based on information they were hearing from non-
official stations and that was either absent or ran contrary to that which was being 
presented inside the country. Soviet oral agitators were often unable to cope with the 
barrage of inquiries put to them by listeners to foreign broadcasting. Propagandists often 
had to avoid these sharp questions all together or risk intensifying the mistrust they were 
already experiencing. Soviet authorities would train political information specialists 
(politinformators) specifically to respond to these types of questions and refute 
information heard over western radio.35  
 Soviet non-coverage of important issues pushed the public towards unofficial 
sources of information. Since the government maintained a monopoly on the airways 
there was little motivation to develop programs with listeners’ tastes in mind. This goes 
back to the ideology of Soviet broadcasting discussed in earlier chapters, namely that 
radio was regarded as a medium of cultural and educational entertainment; the need to 
provide breaking news or satisfy public curiosity was never in the cards. Newscasts were 
fairly standardized and repetitive, another reason why Soviet radio was stigmatized by 
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citizens as “boring and tendentious.”36 A Pravda article dated January 30, 1953 explained 
the issue: 
The Soviet listener wants to enrich his knowledge and experience by means of the 
radio. Broadcasts on production and scientific themes occupy a larger place in the 
programs but little satisfy the listeners. These programs usually recount names of 
enterprises and people, figures and percentages of plan fulfillment, but the living 
man, with his thoughts and aspirations, his initiative and experience, is supplanted 
by statistics, technical formulas, and general phrases.37 
 
Facts and figures can only go so far in satisfying listener demands for entertainment and 
relevant news. The ignorance of popular tastes prompted many to fulfill these desires 
through other broadcasting outlets. 
The press was also famous for avoiding information about disasters and other 
events of an unplanned nature. These were the same frustrations listeners had about local 
broadcasting. When natural disasters or industrial accidents happened nearby there was 
rarely acknowledgement or details despite the popular demand for information. As the 
Soviet-Afghan War sank into a stalemate and began drawing criticism, citizens 
increasingly turned to western radio to try and learn the truth about the country’s 
occupation. In 1987, 45% of Russia’s urban population was receiving news about the war 
from western radio and two-thirds of this audience disapproved of the country’s 
involvement, presumably from finding out how bad the conflict was going. According to 
Radio Liberty’s survey, following the Chernobyl meltdown, 36% of respondents admitted 
to turning to western radio to gain information beyond what little news was being made 
domestically. So influential was foreign broadcasting that following the Korean Airlines 
Flight 007 incident in 1983, 80% of non-listeners believed the official Soviet version of 
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the events compared to only 18% among those that were getting their news from western 
stations.38 For these reasons, listeners could view even general news programs as anti-
Soviet just because they relayed the truth, even when there was not an anti-Soviet intent. 
 While news and information was certainly the biggest reason for the growth of 
western broadcasting, others took the risks to find out more about non-Soviet ways of 
life. As mentioned earlier, the Soviet listener always had a curiosity for international 
news and frequently cited boredom with domestic press coverage. 62% of respondents to 
Radio Liberty admitted listening to western stations simply to learn more about the 
outside world.39 VOA was likely the most listened to program for this reason. The station 
broadcasted fewer denunciations of the Soviet Union and more general news about life in 
the United States. The station also broadcasted modern music which 20% of respondents 
admitted was the reason they listened. American jazz and rock was popular but so too 
were music programs from Italy, Germany, France, and Iran to name a few. Starting in 
1955, Willis Conover’s jazz program on VOA was so popular that he became a celebrity 
in Russia and throughout Eastern Europe. Western jazz was often the entertainment for 
parties and small social gatherings.  
Especially interesting in exploring motivations is to hear from listeners about the 
style of western broadcasts. The vast majority of respondents preferred those programs 
that were direct in their attacks on the Soviet regime and avoided getting too much into 
“philosophical discussions.”40 Commentaries, information about the history of 
communist regime, problems on the kolkhoz, and comparisons of civil liberties were 
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some of the most popular aspects of western radio. Some respondents believed VOA soft 
pedaled too much and did not expose the regime for its abuses and contradictions, 
begging authorities to do something rather than actively criticizing them. One listener 
said that he preferred “sharp propaganda” that flat out gave its point of view rather than 
danced around it, such as explaining what an American worker could earn and what he 
could do with that money.41 Plenty of others switched to German and British 
broadcasting since America was “too delicate in their comments.”42 Another complained 
about the style of British broadcasting saying, “I do not like the BBC because they tell 
you that Attlee flew someplace or else they give over the radio biographies of Bevin and 
Churchill etc. People are risking their lives to listen to BBC and they broadcast 
biographies.”43  
 Not every listener was looking to subvert the regime and embrace western 
viewpoints. Out of the Radio Liberty survey, 8% cited “know the adversary” as a reason 
for listening to foreign radio.44 Presumably these were party members either familiarizing 
themselves with “bourgeois propaganda,” or at least towing the line with their response. 
Party members were much more likely to listen to VOA, Deutsche Welle, and other 
programs that were not as inflammatory in their denunciations of the Soviet system.45 It 
would seem that tuning into foreign stations was more an act of curiosity than outright 
resistance to the regime. As can be discerned from understanding the motivations behind 
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listening to western radio, citizens were simply looking to get expanded and faster news 
coverage, enjoy music not played in the Soviet Union, and learn about life outside their 
borders. As Alex Inkeles put it in 1959, “even if he (the citizen) is a completely loyal 
supporter of the regime he is frequently aware of a disparity between its policies and his 
own sense of curiosity or his need for certain sorts of information. As a result he tries to 
get information through unofficial channels…”46 Interviews with listeners frequently 
show that displeasure with Soviet media was not tantamount to dissatisfaction with the 
regime. Citizens were bombarded with propaganda denouncing the west and its bourgeois 
decadence, it is easy then to understand that listeners wanted to find out what all the fuss 
was about. Of course, there were plenty who viewed their own government as corrupt and 
unrepresentative of its people but that does not mean that western broadcasting was the 
rallying point for an anti-Soviet movement. In fact, the question must be asked: to what 
extent did official Soviet attacks on foreign radio increase curiosity about it and drive 
people closer to the broadcasts? Much like a child who attempts to go where he is told is 
forbidden, listeners knew that the regime and its authorities discouraged western radio 
and that alone was reason enough to hear what the enemy voices had to say.  
 
Soviet Responses to Western Broadcasting 
 While listening to western broadcasting was never officially made a crime, such 
blatant attempts by Western radio stations to undermine the regime could not go 
unaddressed. Soviet authorities attempted to rationalize this expanding audience by 
arguing that foreign radio was a holdover from the bourgeois past. Enemy voices, they 
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argued, represented a sophisticated style of psychological warfare that targeted young 
people who were highly vulnerable to such western manipulation.47 Soviet authorities 
viewed the public as sensitive, unstable, naïve, and prone to erupt at the slightest moment 
of stress; resultantly, it feared what foreign broadcasting could provoke. As discussed 
earlier, the penalties for listening to non-Soviet media were generally prison sentences of 
around ten years. When asked who could listen without fear, one respondent declared: 
“there is no such category – only a few people in Moscow who have orders to control and 
transcribe foreign broadcasts may do it without being afraid.”48  
 Official sources attempted to respond to foreign voices by discrediting them. 
Authorities portrayed western broadcasters as manipulative, existing only to sow 
disbelief in the minds of loyal Soviet citizens. A Pravda article dated September 1980 
commented: 
"Birds of a feather flock together" is the best way to describe the close contacts 
between the Voice of America, the BBC, Deutsche Welle and other western radio 
stations with Radio Liberty / Radio Free Europe. Despite the official signboard of 
government information agencies, recently these radio voices have been taking a 
more and more active part in the “psychological warfare” against the socialist 
countries-conducting subversive propaganda, in the full sense of the term. 
 
Thus, where as in the past the heads of these radio stations steered clear of the 
direct use of inflammatory appeals by various dissidents to combat the system 
existing in the USSR and other socialist countries, leaving the publicizing of the 
dissidents’ “views” to the Radio Liberty / Radio Free Europe, now the Voice of 
America, the BBC and Deutsche Welle are offering them their microphones, 
sometimes a lot of hours to their delirious fabrications.49 
 
Programming deemed most offensive were commentaries on domestic affairs especially 
unflattering accounts of émigrés; many stations broadcasting in Russian were staffed by 
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Russian expatriates which made these programs even more threatening to the regime.50 
Special political information specialists were trained to handle sharp questions and 
respond to information and claims made by foreign sources. The Soviet magazine RT had 
one purpose: carry warnings about outside broadcasts and discredit whenever possible. In 
one twenty month period, it rebutted VOA fifteen times, BBC nine times, Deutsche 
Welle eight times, and Radio Free Europe two times. As was standard practice, Radio 
Liberty was not even mentioned by authorities; its anti-Soviet agenda was so direct that 
officials did not want to call attention to its existence.51 After 1958, authorities forbade 
the sale of higher frequency shortwave sets but people could almost always find ways to 
alter them. In fact, throughout the 1960s, consumers who purchased a new radio would 
often be approached by “radio doctors,” someone offering to modify a set’s receiving 
capability for a price.52  
 In a paradoxical way, western broadcasting could actually be seen as working to 
the regime’s advantage. For some officials, foreign propaganda broadcasts into the 
country was proof positive of capitalist deception and their struggle with the Soviet 
Union; on all accounts it confirmed the Soviet worldview. As Kristin Roth-Ey claimed, 
the “phenomenon of foreign broadcasting to the USSR was also a ringing testament to its 
modern, technologically advanced society and a backhanded compliment to its 
international importance.”53 Sometimes the Soviet government was able to push for 
modifications in the content of western broadcasting on the diplomatic front. Since 
programs like VOA and Radio Liberty were partly funded by the American government, 
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the Soviets could promise their cooperation on one matter in exchange for altering 
something particularly troublesome in the content of transmissions. Nevertheless, there 
was still no denying that the popularity of foreign radio in the USSR was an 
embarrassment to the regime both at home and abroad. In the words of Maury Lisann: 
Those responsible for the management of propaganda and internal ideological 
cohesion made it clear that the aspect of foreign radio broadcasts that bothered 
them most was simply the constant supply of hard news, in itself not necessarily 
anti-Soviet or politically oriented, but constantly holding the Soviet press up to an 
unfavorable comparison and thereby undermining public confidence in the 
credibility of all aspects of the regime’s dealings with the people.54 
 
If the very nature of domestic broadcasting made listeners turn their dial to western 
media, there was always the option of removing that incentive by competing at home for 
audience with better information services. 
 By the 1960s, Soviet authorities were becoming responsive to the calls for media 
reform especially as the audience for foreign broadcasting was on the rise. As one Soviet 
journalist put it: 
We must respond promptly to various, perhaps unfavorable, phenomena and 
incidents that occur in our life. Or else it turns out that while we keep silent, the 
people learn about them in incorrect and distorted interpretations. We still 
consider ourselves to have a monopoly in the field of information. But this isn’t 
so. After all, by lagging in information, we sometimes involuntary orient people 
to foreign radio, and once any false version begins it is difficult to stamp it out.55 
 
Radio had originally been envisioned as a vertical top-down medium for information, 
with the development of western radio the medium had become horizontal. Overly 
repetitive and ultimately slow news was seen as one of the major reasons why citizens 
were listening to enemy voices. Some even blamed the phenomenon on the success the 
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nation had made in the last forty years. Mikhail Kharlamov, head of radio and television 
administration, answered the question other party leaders were asking: “why do people 
listen to VOA and the BBC? We’re the guilty ones here…  now that many of our 
listeners have become more literate, educated, they want to know a lot of things, and we 
hide a lot of things in this way, we artificially arouse their interest in programs from 
foreign countries.”56 In an effort to prevent listening to western radio, Soviet authorities 
introduced comprehensive broadcasting reform in an attempt to give Soviet audiences the 
kind of programming they believed listeners wanted. Deeming faster news reportage and 
music the primary reasons for tuning into VOA and others like it, the regime created 
Mayak (beacon) in 1964, the first station dedicated to round-the-clock news and 
entertainment. Every half hour, Mayak provided five minutes of news coverage with 
twenty-five minutes of music. This marked the first time that news was being reported 
regularly and, in an attempt to avoid redundancy, it was always different. 57 The focus on 
news distribution was seen as the first defense against foreign broadcasting. As one 
article explained, it was imperative to: 
recognize that bourgeois information agencies have achieved a high operational 
efficiency, immediately responding to everything happening in the world, while 
we are sometimes late. This means that the false version flies around the world 
faster than the truthful and exact one. And the first report produces some times the 
greater impression! In contemporary conditions the spread of information and its 
operational effect is becoming the most important spirit of ideological struggle, 
and in this, complacency is inadmissible.58  
 
As a direct challenge to these stations, Mayak broadcasted its most popular programs at 
11pm when VOA listenership was at its height.  
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There is little doubt that Mayak was, at least to some degree, a successful 
enterprise. A poll conducted in 1965 showed that 70% of listeners reported to listening to 
Mayak some of the time while another 36% reported to be regular listeners.59 The station 
was also broadcast on the same band frequency as Radio Liberty and thus acted as a type 
of auxiliary jammer. The Mayak formula was popular enough to be imitated in some of 
the other Soviet republics, notably Promin in the Ukraine and Araz in Azerbaijan. 
Despite these successes and initial reforms, Mayak remained hampered by rigid censors 
and the complex apparatus needed to get information approved before dissemination. The 
very act of censoring information almost ensures that breaking news is unable to be 
delivered in a timely fashion. If Mayak hoped to play a significant role in combating 
bourgeois propaganda it would take more than just providing a new format for news and 
information but actually engaging in an overhaul of the existing censorship apparatus; 
changes that the regime would ultimately fail to support. As Stephen Lovell put it, “at 




Despite the comprehensive media reform, constant fear of punishment, and 
campaign to discredit western radio, its listenership continued and in most cases was only 
expanding. Lisann again puts this poignantly:   
The dilemma was perfectly clear: foreign radio made it impossible to manage the 
news about important events in accordance with the ideological planning for 
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them, yet at the same time, even after the most blatant evidence of the breakdown 
in those plans, the regime was flatly unwilling to provide full reporting that 
couldn’t anyway satisfy those who turned to foreign radio. The ideological 
requirements of news management were apparently still considered irreconcilable 
with the conditions necessary for effective competition with foreign radio. The 
gap must have engendered frustration, and opened an opportunity for the 
advocates of the simple shortcut to a solution: the resumption of jamming.61 
 
The process of jamming foreign broadcasts started with the Voice of America in 1948 
and would be applied selectively and inconsistently after 1963. Interestingly, the 
intensification and cessation of jamming could usually be seen as a barometer of East-
West relations. For instance, the jamming of most foreign broadcasts resumed following 
the Prague Spring in 1968 but would be relaxed again in 1973 as the Cold War entered its 
period of détente and culminated in the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Jamming 
basically implied the creation of interfering static, broadcast on the same band as the 
targeted station or the use of high-pitched sounds designed both to block the signal as 
well as irritate the listener. During jamming, listeners would have to settle for whichever 
station had the most audible signal at that moment. By and large, music stations and 
broadcasts not in Russian were left alone. Often, selective jamming was utilized and 
varied in accordance with minute by minute content of the broadcast; individual items 
could be jammed depending on how they furthered or conflicted with Soviet politics at a 
particular moment. This strategy may have been useful in using foreign broadcasting to 
prepare public opinion for policy changes. For instance, the regime was not jamming 
VOA reports of Soviet nuclear tests perhaps as a way to let the public know of the 
country’s military capabilities without making official statements about it on their own.  
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 Despite their best efforts, jamming radio stations was never an exact science. In 
fact, outside of Moscow, Leningrad, and a few other urban areas, foreign broadcasts were 
easy to get even during the periods of the most intense jamming. If the interference was 
bad enough, some listeners could get in a car and drive out to their dacha and listen 
unhindered.62 One respondent commented that he never found the jamming of VOA to be 
particularly effective as long as he kept his ear close enough to the radio.63 It may also 
seem puzzling as to why authorities would cease jamming when foreign stations were so 
noxious for Soviet officials. Part of the reasons for these lulls were due to the nature of 
international events in the Cold War. At times, however, the regime believed that a 
modern international power could not keep shielding its citizens from the outside world. 
There was also a basic assumption that the Soviet political system had so stabilized itself 
that the public could safely absorb large quantities of uncontrolled information. 
Sometimes suspension came as a result of diplomacy as the Soviets claimed at times that 
the United States had restrained the content of VOA and its anti-Soviet propaganda.64 
Part of these trends may have come from the sheer costs involved; by 1995, the country 
was spending more on jamming than it was on its own radio programs.65 Engineers at 
VOA and the BBC estimated that the Soviet Union spent between $500 billion to $1 
billion annually on jamming.66 Worse yet, jamming was so intense at certain times that 
the regime actually began jamming itself!  In the absence of Soviet stations, some 
collective farms could only turn to VOA and BBC to get news and information. 
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 Foreign broadcasters had their own methods to counter Soviet jamming. Western 
stations could broadcast on a wavelength so close to those of domestic stations that to 
jam it could risk jamming themselves. As seen above, even during periods of 
interference, listeners could understand just by staying close to their sets so western 
stations began intensifying the tones of their announcers’ voices in an effort to cut 
through the distortion. Even more crafty, outside programs would change stations mid-
program so as to elude jammers altogether. In the end, jamming was too inefficient, 
inconsistent, and ineffective to bring about any real change to listening habits. A 1973 
listener’s evaluation of audibility showed that Soviet citizens had difficulty distinguishing 
between periods of jamming and other kinds on natural interference. For instance, 14% of 
listener’s rated Radio Liberty’s reception as “better than fair” before the suspension of 
jamming. That number actually dropped to 13 percent after it ended. For the BBC those 
numbers were 23 percent and 23 percent respectively, meaning there was no change in 
the station’s audibility!67 Given the immense size of the country, complete jamming was 
nearly impossible and listeners who wanted their fill of western broadcasts were largely 
unhindered in their efforts. As a result, foreign radio became an important avenue for 
many Soviet listeners. As Eugene Parta argued: 
Broadcasts were a means, not an end. They were a channel of information that 
reported the news, keep the flame of hope alive, but there had to be a vessel to 
contain that flame. That vessel was a large audience that was receptive to these 
broadcasts, to the factual information they provided and the implicit message of 
hope they contained.68 
 
Many listeners did believe that western broadcasters legitimately cared for the people of 
the Soviet Union. “The VOA cares for the Soviet people who never saw America,” one 
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respondent recalled, “the VOA wants to help us through its broadcasts, but they can’t do 
very much, since its broadcasts are being jammed and can’t be heard very well.”69 
 
“Radio Hooligans” 
 In Chapter 1, radio amateurs were among those individuals at the forefront of 
radio broadcasting in Russia in the 1920s. Ever since these earliest days, ham radio 
operating was a popular hobby made up of enthusiasts who would modify their own sets 
to receive and communicate with foreign broadcasters. Often referred to as “radio 
hooligans” by those in authority, these hobbyists often used military lines to 
communicate illegally. They also frequently operated within medium wave frequencies 
reserved for state broadcasts causing interference and thus were regarded as a national 
security threat. Usually falling between the ages of 16 and 20, these amateurs received 
information directly from foreigners in places like the United States and Australia on 
topics such as houses and prices on consumer goods; resultantly, these people often found 
themselves under the watch of the NKVD.70 Most radio amateurs lived in the Soviet 
Union’s outlying areas where there was little else in the way of entertainment.71 
 Often referring to themselves as “kings” and “lords,” these amateurs created quite 
a debate since most legal codes had no provisions for ham operating. Numerous articles 
appeared in newspapers throughout the 1960s and 1970s to either denounce these 
hooligans as criminals or to push for changes in broadcasting regulations to allow these 
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frustrated ham operators a legal avenue to explore their interests. Despite the interference 
they caused, some looked upon these hobbyists as representing a positive of the Soviet 
system. An article appearing in Komsomolskaya Pravda in 1974 offered the explanation: 
Strange as it may seem, it is positive changes in our life that are behind radio 
hooliganism. First, rising material prosperity enables every young radio hooligan 
to possess his own radio-phonograph, tape recorder, etc. Second, knowledge 
about radio technology has increased: Almost one-third of the hundreds of illegal 
radio operators apprehended in Moscow and Moscow Province were between the 
ages of 12 and 14. In the 1930s a 12-year-old radio designer would have been 
looked on as a child prodigy - today there are thousands of them.72  
 
The vast majority of these amateurs were almost certainly not attempting to cause chaos 
and disruption on Soviet channels. Many of them were just young adults with an interest 
in technology; a few were simply broadcasting a song dedicated to their girlfriend.73 
When these young people were found, most were simply told to appear in court, pay a 
fine, and surrender their equipment. If anything, the phenomenon of radio hooliganism 
was a testament to the way in which radio had been fully embraced by Soviet citizens by 
the 1960s. 
 
Undermining the Regime 
 Despite the vast potential radio could have in the Soviet Union and was having 
elsewhere in the West, there seems to be strong evidence to suggest that it was slowly 
undermining the regime. Part of this was due in large measure to the impact that western 
broadcasting was having while the other half can be attributed to domestic problems that 
were drawing criticism. If foreign radio was so dangerous, why did the Soviet Union 
continue to build wireless sets that allowed for the reception of shortwave broadcasts? 
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The question is an interesting one, especially given the fact that ever since 1949, the 
USSR was producing more shortwave radios than all other countries of the world 
combined. In 1958, a Central Committee investigation showed that 85% of wireless sets 
were in the European part of Russia where no Soviet stations were even broadcasting on 
shortwave and where the only thing to listen to was foreign broadcasting. To answer the 
question asked, industry was more likely to try and produce the most current technology 
so as to continue bragging about the potential of Soviet manufacturing. Shortwave sets 
were also what citizens were looking to buy and perhaps they continued to be made in an 
effort to see sales quotas reached. Either way, “the great irony of this Trojan horse,” 
Kristin Roth-Ey argues, “is that it was built in large measure by the conquered peoples 
hands: Soviet industry produced the shortwave sets that carried enemy voices (even as 
the regime was also pouring millions into a futile effort to shut them up).”74  
 The other component to the argument against wireless sets was that it weakened 
the regime’s ability to keep a control on public opinion as radio listening became more 
private. Before the war, radio promoted collective listening as individuals would gather 
together to hear the radio orchestra or find out about the progress of spring fieldwork and 
the competition between brigades.75 As radio became more everyday, these collective and 
public acts became more private and the communal element was lost. Listeners were now 
interacting with news and culture on their own terms, rather than being fed whatever the 
local speaker was broadcasting. In the words of Roth-Ey, “foreign broadcasting… offered 
an unauthorized private experience without limits and with designs on everyday life. Its 
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very presence in Soviet space was an anthem to the regime’s impotence; its very 
popularity suggested that Soviet culture was substandard, replaceable, even irrelevant.”76  
 All of these developments were made worse when placed in the context of the 
ineptitude of Soviet-controlled media. The lack of a coherent media policy put great 
strains on the practice of mass communications inside the USSR. Even with new 
programming and stations such as Mayak, officials were still trying to capture new and 
faster reporting within the confines of traditional controlled news. The inability to 
provide up-to-date information led listeners to seek out other sources as the Soviet news 
system was “so paralyzed by internal constraints that until…prodded from above, it 
cannot even report an event bringing down its own buildings around its heads.”77 By 
many reports, Soviet news ran so contrary to what listeners were seeing around them that 
it undermined the basic ideological legitimacy of the whole system. According to Lisann, 
based on interview data, about 20 – 30% of the population generally doubted the 
credibility of all Soviet information sources.78 Soviet authorities clearly understood the 
essential components to effective media as Radio Moscow’s broadcasts to foreign 
countries were not hampered by the same constraints as domestic broadcasting. 
Broadcasters were given party approval for greater access to resources, foreign media, 
and were freed from the perpetual slowness in the delivery of information. Even 
announcers were allowed to develop on-air personalities all in an effort to compete with 
foreign media outside the Soviet republics. One has to wonder what may have happened 
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if the same funds and resources were made available to the country’s own media 
institutions.  
Radio in the Final Years of the Soviet Union 
 As the Soviet Union entered the transformative period of its final decade, radio 
would also continue to play its new role albeit with some new competition. By the 1980s, 
the growth of television was a major development in Soviet media. In fact, radio became 
the leisure time activity most displaced by the introduction of television. In rural areas, 
radio listening was the third most displaced activity behind movies and going to the club. 
Radio’s largest audience by this point was in the morning since television was most 
popular at night. On average, 80% of citizens were listening to radio before going to 
work and that number dropped to a staggering 2.3% in the evening when television was 
on. 79 Broadcasting maintained its utilitarian character, providing news, music, weather, 
and crop information for farmers. 
 In the era of glasnost and perestroika, radio was to play a new role. For the first 
time, foreign radio became a legitimate and fully legal participant on the Russian media 
scene. Western programs like Radio Liberty that were still being jammed became 
uncensored for the first time in 1988. Voice of America’s dominance among Soviet 
audiences ended as Radio Liberty moved from the voice of the dissident movement to all 
around political and information focus by 1986. In fact, the station became one of the go-
to sources for information on perestroika. Western radio still had the ability to affect 
public opinion, three out of ten listeners to Western radio believed the government’s 
handling of perestroika was effective whereas that number was about half among non-
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listeners.80 Radio Liberty was used by 30% of Muscovites during the August Coup to 
find out information on fast-breaking news. Gorbachev himself reportedly listened to 
Radio Liberty, BBC, and VOA during his imprisonment.81 Regarded as Radio Liberty’s 
“finest hour” by one former employee, the station played a role in keeping people 
informed when Soviet media was characteristically silent. Leonid Ionin of the liberal 
paper Nezavisimaya Gazet explained: 
Radio Liberty and the BBC defeated the KGB and the CPSU… If the high-level 
plotters had… seized the newspapers, radio stations, television, cut off the 
telephones and isolated the White House [Supreme Soviet building] from 
Moscow, and Moscow from the rest of the Soviet Union and the world – they 
would have succeeded. Any other way they were doomed.82 
 
This was not the first time in which foreign broadcasting filled in for a lack of available 
domestic coverage though it may have been the first time it was openly commended by 
Soviet authorities. Yeltsin himself commented that, “during the coup… Radio Liberty 
was one of the very few channels through which it was possible to send messages to the 
whole world and, most important, to the whole of Russia because virtually every family 
in Russia listens to Radio Liberty.”83 As a measure of appreciation, Boris Yeltsin 
permitted Radio Liberty to open a permanent bureau in Moscow! Foreign radio had come 
along way from enemy voice to welcomed participant in the Russian media scene. 
Despite these trends, foreign listening actually dropped starting around 1985 as 
perestroika made Soviet radio livelier and less censored. Domestic broadcasting now 
provided live interviews, group discussions, highlights of upcoming programs, cross-
reporting of events, and special shows on science, medicine, sports, religion, etc. 
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Recognizing that the “content and orientation of broadcasts do much to shape public 
opinion and people’s sentiments,” Gorbachev decreed on July 14, 1990, significant 
changes to the state’s control over radio and television broadcasting. He proclaimed that: 
The functions of state television and radio broadcasting are to be exercised 
independently of political and public organizations in order to serve the goal of 
providing objective and comprehensive coverage of processes taking place in the 
country. Monopolization of airtime by any one party, political trend or grouping is 
impermissible, as is the conversion of state television and radio into a means of 
profit for the personal political views of its employees.84 
 
By the stroke of his pen, the President of the USSR made it illegal for the party to 
monopolize broadcasting for its own benefits and to express its own political views. The 
decree essentially reinvented the purpose radio had been serving since its earliest days 
inside the Soviet Union. Actual media reform brought listeners what they had been 
searching for all these years, a media that could provide breaking information about news 




 The Soviet Union’s postwar years saw substantial changes in everything from 
politics to mass media. In many ways, radio came into its own during this period as 
radiofication expanded the audience and in many ways saturated the market. The ongoing 
Cold War with the United States fueled interest for international news and when obsolete 
media models prevented radio from meeting the needs of its listeners, many began to turn 
to alternate sources of information. These decades represent one of the first times 
audiences were able to control how they listened to radio. The biggest development on 
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this front was the emergence of foreign broadcasting. “Enemy voices” were a constant 
source of concern for the regime yet citizens set aside the risks to find out what the west 
was saying. After years of vilifying the west and its institutions it was only natural that 
citizens developed a healthy curiosity about these supposed “enemies of Soviet labor.”  
 The medium of radio broadcasting is an inherently fascinating one as the airways 
both offer the potential to unite a nation and at the same time let in unwanted voices who 
have the chance to sow the seeds of discord. Foreign radio did not create a movement 
against the Soviet regime but it certainly did not do anything to stop its growth. Radio did 
play a role in destabilizing the regime though western broadcasting cannot be totally to 
blame. The other half of radio’s link with dissatisfaction towards authorities came from 
the ineptitude of domestic broadcasting. Radio Moscow possessed the means by which to 
continue supporting national goals while at the same time provide the style of news and 
entertainment listeners were looking to hear. However, a rigid grasp on outdated models 
of censoring information blocked any chance of achieving the success of media outlets in 
the West. By the time authorities realized their models were driving listeners away, their 
attempts at meaningful reform were ultimately too little and too late. The clamoring for a 
free media would continue long into the 1980s until the Gorbachev reforms finally 
allowed for something at least resembling the media structure of other democratic 
nations. By this time the regime was on its last leg and the new reforms in combination 
with the open listening of foreign broadcasters would be a tidal wave that officials could 
not hope to hold back. Radio, the medium that had supported the state and the party since 
its foundations, had now contributed to their end; its ultimate success was surviving the 
system itself.




 In the words of Mark Hopkins, radio was the “genuine vehicle of social 
revolution.”1 If this is the case, it is hard to imagine that radio could find a better home 
than that of the Soviet Union, one of the twentieth century’s most prolific examples of 
social transformation. Following the success of the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks 
faced a monumental task that was almost unprecedented in the history of the modern 
world. A relatively obscure minority had seized power and was attempting to bring about 
complete political, economic, social, and cultural transformation in the world’s largest 
country. This unenviable task was no doubt daunting but the early Bolsheviks were 
resolved to seize the opportunity and set themselves to work. Fortunately for the party, 
broadcasting technologies were established enough that radio seemed to be a way to 
shrink the vast expanse of the nation and unite the people behind a common message and 
inspire in them the flame of creating the classless society. 
 The potential of radio broadcasting seems almost unlimited given the extent of 
work that lay before the Soviet authorities. Even as the original party creed was lost in 
the early years of the regime and later corrupted under the totalitarian influence of Stalin, 
radio seemed posed and ready to support the goals of whatever captains were steering the 
ship. The collective participation that radio fostered in the early years as listeners huddled 
around public amplifiers was the kind of behavior the party supported. Radio offered the 
opportunity to broadcast not only propaganda and other information geared at agitation 
but also other cultural programs aimed at public enlightenment. The size and diversity of 
the country worked against the regime, made worse by the lack of education and literacy 
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that ran rampant; party organs like Pravda and Izvestiia could only go so far. Radio was 
perfectly suited to bring cultures together, unite the peasants with the proletariat, connect 
both ends of the country, and extend the oral agitation network already being developed. 
This was the potential radio offered; it was the vehicle to drive a backward nation into the 
twentieth century. 
 Unfortunately for the regime and the mass of the Soviet people, this opportunity 
was never realized. The reality was that radio was never able to live up to its potential, 
due in large part to the mishandling by the same regime that needed the technology so 
desperately. In the earliest decades of the party, radio played a very minor role. Thanks to 
problems with electrification and the lack of funds necessary to bring the wired network 
to the mass of the peasantry, broadcasts were unable to reach huge swaths of the country. 
Even in areas where the technology was in place, radio was unable to stand out as a 
medium that was in anyway different from print media. As a result, radio was stigmatized 
as persistently dull for much of its life as it simply repeated the same information being 
heard in the newspapers, by agitators, and in union meetings. Even the creation of Mayak 
was not enough to draw in listeners. Until the era of perestroika, broadcast programming 
lacked character and the necessary liveliness to appeal to audiences. Despite the 
negatives, radio’s ability to unite the country in the face of Nazi invasion was a testament 
to the potential broadcasting technology offered; it was all too unfortunate for listeners 
that these lessons were soon forgot. As with other Soviet mass media, the discrepancy 
between what was real and what was being reported led to a lack of trust in the regime. 
The more slowly that news was being reported and the more the censors prevented 
meaningful broadcasts, the more some Soviet listeners tuned to the multitude of foreign 
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voices being broadcast into the country. Each varied with regards to the intensity of its 
anti-Soviet message though almost all undermined the authority of domestic 
broadcasting. Rather than sponsor meaningful reforms, Soviet authorities invested 
between $500 million and $1 billion annually into jamming foreign broadcasts such as 
the BBC, VOA, and Radio Liberty.2 In the end, only fifty-one percent of listeners said 
that jamming caused them to listen less frequently.3 
 For much of the early history of Soviet radio, listeners were largely unaffected by 
the medium. The predominance of wired loudspeakers only in public places and the 
relative lack of them in the countryside meant that the average citizen was unexposed. 
Even as wireless sets grew in popularity, the relative expensiveness of these devices kept 
consumers away until the late 1950s and early 1960s. Once these sets became the norm, 
the collective nature of radio gave way to the individual’s greater control of their own 
listening. Decisions were being made about how to interact with culture on one’s own 
terms within the privacy of one’s home. Many listeners were more interested in music 
and other entertainment programs than they were about production figures or information 
about the autumn harvest. International news was the one bit of information many 
listeners cared to hear though it was also the news less likely to be aired. Despite these 
frustrations most listeners did not turn to foreign stations in ways to subtly defy the 
regime. For the most part, listeners were driven more by curiosity and the lure of the 
forbidden. What they found was news and entertainment that further exposed the 
fundamental issues of their own broadcasting.  
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Radio did not single-handedly bring down the Soviet Union. What is clear is that 
radio never quite mobilized the population as it did for the Nazis in Germany or led to the 
cultural appeal the way it did in the United States. In this, the Soviet Union missed an 
opportunity to take hold of that “genuine vehicle of social revolution.” Then again, the 
same can be said of many other things in the Soviet system. Radio is intrinsically part of 
the much larger story of Soviet successes and failures. In 1895, Alexander Popov 
demonstrated the potential of radio broadcasting and ever since Russia’s claim to the 
birth of radio has been mired in debate, it seems only fitting that at the end of the Soviet 
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